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THE OBSOLESCENCE OF WALL STREET: 
A CONTEXTUAL APPROACH TO 




This article is dedicated to Professor Al Conard, a wonderful col-
league, who after many years as an active emeritus member of the Uni-
versity of Michigan Law School has recently retired to a new home 
away from Ann Arbor. Many of us miss him daily, and I offer this 
article in the spirit of a Festschrift contribution in his honor. 
At its core, the primary policy of the federal securities lawsi in-
volves the remediation of information asymmetries. This is most 
obviously true with respect to the mandatory disclosure system, 
which compels business corporations and other securities issuers to 
disseminate detailed, generally issuer-specific information when 
selling new securities to the public and requires specified issuers2 to 
file annual and other periodic reports containing the same or simi-
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1971, UCLA; J.D. 1974, Harvard. -
Ed. 
1. There are seven federal securities laws: The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a 
(1988); the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1988); the Public Utility Hold-
ing Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1988); the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77aaa (1988); the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (1988); the Invest-
ment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 (1988); and the Securities Investor Protection 
Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 78aaa (1988). For general descriptions, see 1 Lows Loss & JoEL 
SEUGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 226-70 (1989). This article addresses the Securities Act 
and the Securities Exchange Act, which are the two federal securities statutes of greatest 
enduring significance. 
2. The Securities Exchange Act requires annual, quarterly, and, on occasion, monthly 
reports to be filed by firms that satisfy specified criteria. Most notably, these firms must have 
(i) a security registered on a national securities exchange, see § 12(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78l(a) 
(1988); (ii) total assets of $5 million or more and a class of equity security held of record by 
500 or more security holders when its securities are not traded on a national securities ex-
change and are traded in the alternative over-the-counter market, see § 12(g)(l), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78l(g)(l) (1988); Rule 12g-1, 17 c.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (1994); or (iii) a security registered 
under the Securities Act, unless and until the security is held by fewer than 300 persons, see 
§ 15(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (1988). Regarding the categories of issuers required to file 
mandatory annual and periodic reports under the Securities Exchange Act, see generally 4 
Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 1, at 1733-1916. 
There are currently about 13,400 issuers that file annual and periodic reports under the 
Securities Exchange Act. See Private Litigation under the Federal Securities Laws: Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 
103d Cong., 1st Sess. 341 (1993) (statement of A.A. Sommer, Jr.). 
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lar information.3 This system was, in essence, a response to the fail-
ure of business and foreign government issuers sufficiently to 
disclose information material to investment decisions in the period 
preceding the en~ctment of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities 
Act)4 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act).s 
The remediation of information asymmetries is also a primary 
policy objective of the Securities and Exchange Commission's regu-
lation of broker-dealers.6 The Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) uses a variety of reporting,1 record keeping,s minimum 
net capital,9 and inspection10 techniques to deter broker-dealers 
from charging securities customers excessive commissions or 
"markups" in individual transactions11 and to protect customers 
from entrusting their securities or monies to broker-dealers on the 
verge of insolvency.12 
While the theory and techniques of federal securities regulation 
are relatively straightforward, the scope of the mandatory disclo-
sure system and broker-dealer regimens has been fluid over time. 
3. The textual content of the. mandatory disclosure system is specified in Regulation S-K, 
17 C.F.R. § 229 (1994). The SEC's accounting requirements are detailed in Regulation S-X, 
17 C.F.R. § 210 {1994). Regarding both, see generally 2 Loss & SBUOMAN, supra note 1, at 
620-743. 
4. Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 S~t. 74 {codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77 {1988)). 
5. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1988)); see 
Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. CoRP. 
L. 1 (1983); see also 1 Loss & SBUOMAN, supra note 1, at 171-229. 
6. Section 15{a){l) of the Exchange Act requires registration with the SEC of broker-
dealers that "effect any transactions in, or ••• induce or attempt to induce the purchase or 
sale of, any security," other than specified exempted securities. § 15(a)(l), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78o(a)(l) {1988). Regarding the registration requirement, see 6 Loss & SBUOMAN, supra 
note 1, at 2965-76. A registered broker-dealer must also be a member of a self-regulatory 
organization. This usually means the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) or 
a securities exchange. See 6 id. at 2815-16. 
7. Broker-dealers are required both to report periodically about the finances of their 
firm, see 7 Loss & SBUOMAN, supra note 1, at 3117-28 (describing Rule 17a-5, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.17a-5 (1994), and Form X-17A-5), and to provide confirmation statements and other 
reports to securities customers, see 8 id. at 3803-16 {discussing Rule lOb-10, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.lOb-10 (1994)). 
8. See 7 id. at 3107-16. 
9. See 7 id. at 3128-57. 
10. See 7 id. at 3190-98. 
11. Cf. Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 437 {2d Cir. 1943) ("The essential 
objective of securities legislation is to protect those who do not know market conditions from 
the overreachings of those who do."), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1944). 
12. There are other regulations also applicable to broker-dealers, such as the securities 
customer insurance scheme established in 1970 by the Securities Investor Protection Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 78aaa-78lll (1988), see 7 Loss & SBUOMAN, supra note 1, at 3306-28, and the 
prohibitions of fixed brokerage commission rates, see 6 id. at 2831-97. 
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Exemptions for intrastate13 and private - rather than public -
initial sales,14 municipal15 and federal government securities,16 as 
well as unanticipated new :financial products11 have limited or ex-
panded the scope of federal securities regulation with increased ce-
lerity in recent years. 
The immediate future of federal securities regulation is likely to 
be devoted in considerable part to the resolution of boundary ques-
tions. The reasons for this are less matters of statutory construction 
than they are matters of politics and context. In terms of informa-
tion asymmetries, there is often little practical difference between 
financial instruments subject to the federal securities laws and those 
that are exempt. In many instances, the exemptions to securities 
laws were adopted because of the success of political lobbies such 
as those that championed state securities regulation or municipal 
issuers.18 Yet, once adopted, laws do not endure eternally because 
of inertia. As the factual context against which Congress and the 
SEC have acted changes, an ongoing process of law revision contin-
uously occurs. 
This article begins in Part I by describing the dynamic elements 
in federal securities regulation. These include (i) changes in the in-
vestor community, (ii) internationalization of issuers and investors, 
(iii) computer technology, and (iv) the maturing of :financial 
economics. 
Part II illustrates how these dynamics will continue to change 
the boundaries of federal securities regulation in three illustrative 
13. See Securities Act § 3(a)(ll), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(ll) (1988); 3 Loss & SELIGMAN, 
supra note 1, at 1274-1307; see also Exchange Act§ 15(a)(l), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(l) (1988); 6 
Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 3009-12. See generally infra text accompanying notes 
112-44 (discussing state securities regulation). 
14. Securities Act § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1988); 3 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note l, at 
1350-450. 
15. Securities Act§ 3(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1988); Exchange Act§§ 3(a)(12), 15B, 
15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(12), 78o-4 (1988); see also 3 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 1159-73; 
4 id. at 1782-89; 6 id. at 3086-95. See generally infra text accompanying notes 198-215 (dis-
cussing municipal securities). 
16. Securities Act § 3(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1988); Exchange Act § 3(a)(12), 15 
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(12) (1988); Exchange Act § 15C, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-5 (1988); see also 3 Loss & 
SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 1158-59; 4 id. at 1782-86; 6 id. at 3095-103. 
17. Examples of this phenomenon include variable annuities, which are considered to be 
securities despite the exemption for insurance products in Securities Act § 3(a)(8), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77c(a)(8) (1988), see 2 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note l, at 1000-20, and employee benefit 
plans, many of which are not securities, see 2 id. at 1031-50. More recently, over-the-counter 
(OTC) derivatives have emerged as a major concern. See infra text accompanying notes 100-
111. 
18. See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF TiiE 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 65, 187-88 
(1982). 
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areas: (i) state securities regulation, or so-called blue sky laws; (ii) 
the scope of the Securities Act of 1933; and (iii) municipal securities 
regulation. Each of these topics illustrates a different type of 
boundary problem. First, state securities regulation was intended to 
be concurrent with federal securities law. But its initial raison d'etre 
- regulating the merits of new securities offerings - has increas-
ingly been called into question because of the growing significance 
of international securities trading. Second, the scope of the Securi-
ties Act of 1933 has recently been effectively narrowed because of 
· congressional and SEC initiatives in response to competitive inter-
national securities markets and the growth of institutional investors. 
Here, however, matters are more complicated than they may seem 
at first.19 In part, what may appear to be a significant reduction of a 
mandatory disclosure regime may involve instead a substitution of 
ongoing obligations, implied by :financial economics theory. Finally, 
the logic of the exemption for new securities issuances by munici-
palities has dissipated over time, at least for certain categories of 
municipal securities as they have come more closely to resemble 
corporate issuances.20 
When these boundary questions are viewed jointly, three basic 
themes emerge: 
First, the remediation of information asymmetries endures as a 
policy justification for important aspects of federal securities regu-
lation. But the need for a mandatory disclosure system varies sig-
nificantly from context to context and is not static over time. 
Second, there are coordination and "level playing field" advan-
tages to subjecting like firms and :financial products to a single regu-
lator. But the probability of this logical outcome occurring is highly 
dependent on political factors. 
Third, the single factor most likely to change fundamentally the 
scope of securities regulation in the foreseeable future is interna-
tionalization. Increasingly, U.S. securities markets are being inte-
19. In a recent article in the Duke Law Journal, Second Circuit Judge and fonner Yale 
law professor Ralph K. Wmter expressed the view that the federal securities laws registration 
and periodic disclosure provisions "will die of their own accord because they are inefficient 
enough that they deter foreign companies from choosing to register their stock in this coun-
try." Ralph K. Wmter, Paying Lawyers, Empowering Prosecutors, and Protecting Managers: 
Raising the Cost of Capital in America, 42 DUKE L.J. 945, 947 n.7 {1993). This, as I elaborate 
infra at text accompanying notes 146-97, appears, at most, to be only partially correct. 
20. Similarly, in 1993, Congress requested a study of whether regulation of government 
securities dealers should continue to be subject to joint SEC-'Ifeasury oversight or, like SEC 
broker-dealer regulation, should solely involve the SEC as the federal government's regula-
tor. Government Securities Act Amendments of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-202, § 112, 107 Stat. 
2344, 2354 {1993). 
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grated into world trading markets. This may portend the evolution 
of a new type of federalism in which national securities regulation is 
"local" and international regulation is the equivalent to national 
regulation today. But this outcome seems unlikely to occur for a 
considerable period of time. The vast preponderance of U.S. secur-
ities are unlikely to be of much interest to international investors. 
More importantly, significant differences between the U.S. investor 
community and. those abroad would make it highly difficult to inte-
grate regulatory regimes without considerable sacrifice of the pri-
mary techniques for protecting noninstitutional investors in the 
United States. 
As a matter of analytical style, this article illustrates a contextu-
alist approach. For a considerable period of time, the dominant an-
alytical style in corporate and securities .law has been a variant of 
economic, or law and economics, analysis. The virtue of this type of 
analysis is that it focuses on what its authors deem to be crucial 
variables and reaches conclusions derived from the core of a spe-
cific legal problem. The defect of this type of analysis is that so 
much is assumed or often assumed away. 
In contrast, the contextualist approach attempts a more ambi-
tious description of the legal - meaning statutory, rule, and agency 
interpretation - historical, and empirical framework of specific 
problems. The defect of this type of approach is that when a prob-
lem is accurately set against its full context, analysis is less likely to 
reach simple, far-reaching conclusions. This is also the virtue of 
contextual analysis. To put matters directly, the world of corporate 
and securities law is often a more complicated, more slowly evolv-
ing one than the law and economics theorists would have us believe. 
While there is great value in economic analysis in this and many 
other fields, this value is best appreciated against a broader histori-
cal and empirical framework than some of its votaries have 
provided. 
I. THE OBSOLESCENCE OF w ALL STREET 
Formally, many aspects of securities trading before the enact-
ment of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 are familiar. To define security in terms such as "any note, 
stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture. "21 is to employ a contempo-
rary vocabulary. Similarly, the mechanisms of securities trading -
21. Securities Act § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b{l) {1988); Exchange Act § 3{a){10), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78c{a)(10) (1988). 
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the underwriter,22 broker,23 dealer,24 or securities exchange25 - are 
denoted in these sixty-year-old laws in terms that, while sometimes 
vague, are easily parsed by today's readers. 
But the factual context in which securities trading occurred 
before the New Deal's enactment of the federal securities laws is 
much less familiar. It was a simpler world. In 1930 the United 
States had a population of approximately 123 million,26 of whom 
approximately 1.5 million - or 1.2% - had securities accounts.21 
Institutional investment was in its infancy. In the years 1926-1929, 
investment companies - the best known of which today is the mu-
tual fund - increased their total assets to over $8 billion,28 an 
amount equal to less than ten percent of the New York Stock Ex-
change's $89.7 billion valuation on September 1, 1929.29 Nonethe-
less, the innovation of buying a portfolio of securities, rather than 
individual stocks, made the investment trust, in the mellifluous 
judgment of John Kenneth Galbraith, " 'the most notable piece of 
speculative architecture of the late twenties, and the one by which, 
more than any other device, the public demand for common stocks 
was satisfied.' "30 Public demand, it cannot be overemphasized, was 
limited to just over one percent of the overall population. 
The period before the New Deal's adoption of the federal secur-
ities laws also witnessed the first significant, and distinctly unsatis-
factory, experience of public investment in foreign securities. 
Between 1923 and 1930, American investors purchased close to $6.3 
billion of foreign bonds.31 Then, in rapid order, the collapse of the 
world economy led to substantial depreciation of over ninety per-
cent of all foreign bonds sold in the United States. By December 
1931, the aggregate market price for fourteen Latin-American na-
22. See Securities Act § 2(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(ll) (1988). 
23. See Exchange Act § 3(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (1988). 
24. See Exchange Act § 3(a)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5) (1988). 
25. See Exchange Act § 3(a)(l), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(l) (1988). 
26. WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 377 (1995). 
27. This figure refers to the number of accounts in 1929. See S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 
2d Sess. 9 (1934). 
28. SEUGMAN, supra note 18, at 222. 
29. S. REP. No. 1455, supra note 27, at 7. 
30. SEUGMAN, supra note 18, at 222 (quoting JOHN KENNETH GALBRAinl, THE GREAT 
CRAsH 51 (1955)). The Senate's Stock Exchange Practices Report was less gracious, writing 
in 1934: "A veritable epidemic of investment trusts afflicted the Nation." S. REP. No. 1455, 
supra note 27, at 339. 
31. S. REP. No. 1455, supra note 27, at 89. This equaled approximately ten percent of 
new security sales in the United States during those years. 2 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HIS-
TORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, at 1006 (1975). 
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tions' bonds was twenty-six percent of their· face value. Peruvian 
bonds were selling at less than seven percent of their par value.32 
Before the 1930s, Wall Street had already experienced techno-
logical revolutions. The nineteenth century had witnessed the arri-
val of the telegraph, the telephone, and the stock quotation ticker, 
which made it possible for securities broker-dealers outside New 
York City to be aware of last sale prices on the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) floor and to place orders on a timely basis.33 
Similarly, before the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was enacted, 
securities were often traded in broker-dealer offices in an over-the-
counter market "unified only by 'a nationwide web of telephone 
and telegraph wires.' "34 Nonetheless, to modem eyes, the trading 
mechanisms of the· early 1930s were quite primitive. Stock quota-
tions in the over-the-counter market, for example, were published 
only once a day in National Quotation Bureau publications, with 
popular names such as the "pink sheets," which listed buy and sell 
quotations for each securities dealer in each stock at the close of the 
previous trading day.35 This guaranteed that these quotes were 
stale on the day that they were used. The pink sheets were, in fact, 
more a telephone directory than a quotation service. Even the au-
gust NYSE did not appear to be much more technologically ad-
vanced. To execute a trade, a floor broker had to pick up an order 
from an off-the-floor trading booth and walk the order to the mid-
dle of the floor for execution by a reciprocal floor broker or special-
ist - a "marketmaker." The floor broker would then scribble 
down the details of the transaction on an order ticket, exchange 
tickets with the reciprocal floor broker or specialist, and walk the 
completed order ticket off the floor.36 Much of this human inter-
mediation was capable of automation. 
Underlying stock trading at that time were theories of securities 
analysis that in retrospect appear similarly simple. The leading 
published work in the field, Graham and Dodd's Security Analy-
sis, 37 included the premise: 
32. Sale of Foreign Bonds or Securities in the United States: Hearings Before the Senate 
Comm. on Fin., 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 324-27 (1931) (statement of Hon. Fiorello H. 
LaGuardia); 75 CONG. REc. 6057 (1932); Henry Grattan Doyle, Investors' Losses in South 
America, 35 CURRENT Hisr. 720, 721 (1932). 
33. ROBERT SOBEL, INSIDE WALL STREET 30-33 (1977). 
34. SEUGMAN, supra note 18, at 141. 
35. 5 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 1, at 2579. 
36. 5 id. at 2508-09. 
37. Benjamin Graham & David L. Dodd's Security Analysis: Principles and Technique 
was initially published in 1934. I quote BENJAMIN GRAHAM ET AL., SECURITY ANALYSIS: 
PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQUE (4th ed. 1962). 
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The most important single factor determining a stock's value is now 
held to be the indicated average feture earning power, i.e., the esti-
mated average earnings for a future span of years. Intrinsic value 
would then be found by first forecasting this earning power and then 
multiplying that prediction by an appropriate "capitalization 
factor. "38 
This type of analysis has long been familiar to students of corporate 
law as a valuation technique employed in the appraisal or calcula-
tion of fair market value for dissenting shareholders in mergers and 
other fundamental transactions.39 This technique is, as Graham and 
Dodd candidly acknowledged, "not an exact science,"40 involving 
estimates of both past average earnings power and multipliers or 
capitalization rates. Calculation of a multiplier could be particu-
larly subjective.41 As one critic was quoted as saying in 1977, 
"[S]uch a valuation is usually 'a guess compounded by an esti-
mate.' "42 Nonetheless, the Graham and Dodd valuation technique 
provided intellectual support for the proposition that shrewd invest-
ment analysts could outtrade most of the market by careful study of 
a corporation's financial statements and other relevant records. 
Graham and Dodd's work also strengthened the hand of those who 
urged that stock acquisition and sale was an investment process, not 
a matter of speculation or gambling.43 
Financial innovation during this period was also primitive. In 
the 1934 version of their work, Graham and Dodd essentially ex-
amined just four types of securities: bonds, preferred stock, com-
mon stock, and stock option warrants.44 Warrants had only been 
38. GRAHAM ET AL, supra note 37, at 28. 
39. See Joel Seligman, Reappraising the Appraisal Remedy, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV, 829, 
851-54 (1984). 
40. GRAHAM ET AL, supra note 37, at 24. 
41. Delaware courts long selected multipliers in reliance on A.S. Dewing's historical data 
in his two-volume treatise, A.S. DEWING, THE FINANCIAL PouCY OF CORPORATIONS (5th 
ed. 1953). See, e.g., Levin v. Midland-Ross Corp., 194 A.2d 50, 57 (Del. Ch. 1963). By the 
mid-1960s, Delaware ceased to rely on Dewing. See, e.g., David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill 
Intl., Inc., 249 A.2d 427, 433-34 (Del. Ch. 1968); Swanton v. State Guar. Corp., 215 A.2d 242, 
244-46 (Del. Ch. 1965). 
42. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 222 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5963, 6181 (quoting Peter Coogan). 
43. In that day, these were crucial distinctions. In 1937, SEC Chairman (later Supreme 
Court Justice) William 0. Douglas stung the NYSE by analogizing exchanges to "private 
clubs" and noting of the NYSE short sale regulations in particular: "In a market in which 
there is such an enormous public interest ••• it is essential that no element of the casino be 
allowed to intrude •... " SEuGMAN, supra note 18, at 163 (quoting WILUAM 0. DouoLAs, 
DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 70 (1940)). In part because the NYSE felt vulnerable to such 
charges, it soon reorganized. 
44. GRAHAM ET AL, supra note 37, at 620-26. 
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authorized for Delaware corporations in March 1929.45 To a con-
siderable extent, the world of corporate finance before the New 
Deal was dominated by three types of securities. The Stock Ex-
change Practices Report of 1934 reported: "As of July 31, 1933, 
there were listed on [thirty-four organized] exchanges 6,057 com-
mon and preferred stock issues with a total market value of 
$95,051,876,295; and 3,798 bond issues with a total market value of 
$49,080,819,993. "46 
In essence this was Wall Street: a securities trading market for a 
very small percentage of the population, dominated by natural per-
sons rather than institutional investors, and featuring domestic se-
curities, human trading intermediation, primitive financial 
economics, and relatively few types of securities. 
This simple structure has long been obsolete. To appreciate the 
extent to which the underlying factual context of federal securities 
regulation has changed, let me separately treat the most significant 
contextual elements. 
A. Changes in the Investor Community 
It is now a commonplace understanding that institutional inves-
tors - most notably public and private pension plans, mutual funds 
and other investment companies, bank trust departments, and in-
surance companies - own slightly over one-half of the United 
States' equities47 and are now responsible for approximately sixty 
45. SEUGMAN, supra note 18, at 43-44. 
46. S. REP. No. 1455, supra note 27, at 5. 
47. The increase in institutional investor ownership has been slow but steady during the 
60-year period after the enactment of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
In 1940, for example, an SEC study made for the Temporary National Economic Commit-
tee {TNEC) and covering the period through 1937 found that of the seven million separate 
holdings of common stock in its list of the SEC's 200 largest nonfinancial corporations, 88% 
were of 100 shares or less - strongly suggestive of low institutional investment. TEMPO-
RARY NATL. ECONOMIC CoMM., MONOGRAPH No. 29, DISTRIBUTION OF OWNERSHIP IN THE 
200 LARGEST NoNFINANCIAL CoRPORATIONs 30 (1940). 
Between 1955 and 1980, the NYSE estimated that holdings of its listed stocks by selected 
institutional investors - insurance companies, investment companies, noninsured pension 
funds, foreign institutions, nonprofit institutions, common trust funds, and mutual savings 
banks - grew from 15% to 35.4%. NEW YORK STOCK EXCH., FACT BOOK 55 (1985). 
In November 1988, a study prepared for the Columbia University School of Law Institu-
tional Investor Project, in consultation with the New York Stock Exchange, updated data 
concerning institutional investment. CAROLYN KAY BRANCATO & PATRICK A. GAUGHAN, 
CoLUMBIA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAw, THE INSTITUTIONAL INvEsroR PRomcr, THE 
GRowm: OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN U.S. CAPITAL MARKErs (Nov. 1988). The study 
calculated that as of 1987, five categories of institutional investors held total assets of $4,644.4 
billion, with pension funds holding $2,018.8 billion (or 43.5% of the total institutional inves-
tor assets); investment companies, $790.4 billion (17%); insurance companies, $1,011.2 billion 
(21.8%); bank trusts, $693.4 billion (14.9%); and foundations and endowments, $130.6 billion 
(2.8% ). Id. at 7. As of 1986, institutional investors had equity holdings of $1,327.2 billion, or 
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to eighty percent of public tracling on the New York Stock Ex-
change.48 As long ago as 1980, 133 million persons indirectly 
owned stock through institutional intermediaries.49 
The implications of this increased rate of institutional trading 
are profound. Between 1962 and 1993, the average size of a trade 
grew from 204 to 1441 shares, with "block,, trading - usually 
trades of 10,000 shares or more - accounting for 53.7% of re-
ported volume in 1993.50 
At the same time, the unfixing of stock brokerage commission 
rates on the NYSE in 1975 significantly furthered an earlier process 
of reducing the transaction costs of institutional investor equity 
trades.51 The Presidential Task Force on Market Mechanisms, 
popularly known as the Brady Report, estimated that between 
April 1975, just before the unfixing of commission rates, and 1986, 
commissions paid by institutions dropped from 26 to 7 .5 cents per 
share.52 Lower transaction costs contributed to the stimulation of 
an enormous surge in reported share volume. Between 1975 and 
1993, the arinual reported volume on the NYSE increased from 
approximately 42.7% of total equities. Id. at 13. A later update to the project estimated that 
by 1990, institutional investors accounted for 53.3% of public and private outstanding equity. 
COLUMBIA SCHOOL OF LAW, THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR PRoracr, INSTITUTIONAL INVES-
TORS AND CAPITAL MARKErs: 1991 UPDATE 8 (1991). Institutional equity holdings in the 
largest 100 corporations as of that date were slightly higher at 54.8%. Id. at 16. 
Similarly, as of the end of the first quarter in 1992, an official of the Securities Industry 
Association calculated, on the basis of Federal Reserve Board data, that institutions held 
54.2% of the $4.96 trillion market value of outstanding stock. Institutions Hold Dominant 
Stake in Equities Market, Fed Board Data Show, 25 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 27, at 943 
(July 9, 1993). 
48. See NEW YoRK STOCK EXCH., FAcr BooK 56 (1985). 
Data covering the. period from May to December of 1985 found that institutional inves-
tors accounted for 61.1 % of NYSE publicly traded stock, with retail customers accounting for 
38.9%. BRANCATO & GAUGHAN, supra note 47, at 16. Institutional investor participation 
rates are lower in other markets. The same study estimated that they accounted for approxi-
mately 30-35% of the trades on the American Stock Exchange (Amex) and specifically 
18.9% of the OTC market for the period January through June 1988. Id. at 15. 
These data ignore proprietary trading by stock exchange members. When proprietary 
trading is thrown into the scales, the percentage of trading by both institutional investors and 
other retail customers declines. For example, in October 1987, the Securities Industry Asso-
ciation estimated that institutions accounted for 39% of purchases on the NYSE; proprietary 
traders, 27%; retail - meaning natural persons who were not proprietary traders - 34%. 
DIVISION op Micr. REG., SEC, THE OcroBER 1987 MARKET BREAK 2-8 n.26 (1988). 
49. NEw YoRK SToCK ExCH., SHAREOWNERSlilP 1980, at 1 (1981). 
50. NEW YoRK STOCK ExCH., FAcr BooK 17, 100 (1994). In 1988, the average size of 
trade reached an annual high of 2303 shares per trade. Id. at 100. 
51. See generally 6 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 1, at 2831-97. 
52. REPORT OF THE PREsIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS 11-15 (1988) 
[hereinafter BRADY REPORT]. 
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4,693.4 to 67,461 billion shares,53 or an increase in average daily 
volume from 18.55 to 264.52 million shares.54 
While institutional ownership has increased spectacularly in the 
post-New Deal period, this trend is less important than the far more 
dramatic increase in individual ownership of U.S. securities. It was 
understood, even before the enactment of the Securities Act of 
1933, that institutional investors did not need the mandatory disclo-
sure system of that Act to protect themselves when acquiring secur-
ities.ss These investors could "fend for themselves."56 
Between 1929and1990, the number of U.S. investors increased 
over thirty-fold, from 1.5 to 51.44 million, and the proportion of the 
U.S. population owning stock rose from 1.2% to 21.1 %.57 Equally 
significant is the fact that the vast majority of these investors ap-
pears to hold relatively modest portfolios. In 1990, the average size 
equity portfolio was $11,400; 34.5% of individual shareholders had 
portfolios valued at less than $5,000.58 These data are consistent 
with the further fact that the 1990 median income of adult share-
holders was $43,800, not notably higher than the $32,000 median 
53. Cf. NEW YoRK STOCK ExOL, FACT BooK 102 (1994}; NEW YORK STOCK ExOL, 
FACT BOOK 73 (1988). 
54. NEW YORK STOCK EXCH., FACT BOOK 101 (1994). 
55. As James Landis, one of the drafters of the Securities Act, wrote in a reminiscence: 
· The sale of an issue of securities to insurance companies or to a limited group of exper-
ienced investors, was certainly not a matter of concern to the federal government. That 
bureaucracy, untrained in these matters as it was, could hardly equal these investors for 
sophistication, provided only it was their own money that they were spending. 
James Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 
29, 37 (1959). 
56. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953). 
57. Regarding 1929 datum, see supra note 27 and accompanying text. The NYSE has 
periodically published studies of shareownership. 1\vo of these studies report the following 
data on shareholders as a percent of the population: 
Millions of Shareholders as 
Year shareholders percent of population 
1952 6.49 4.2 
1956 "8.63 5.2 
1959 12.49 7.1 
1962 17.01 9.2 
1965 20.12 10.4 
1970 30.85 15.1 
1975 25.27 11.9 
1980 30.20 135 
1981 32.26 14.4 
1983 42.36 18.5 
1985 47.04 20.1 
1990 51.44 21.l 
NEW YoRK SroCK ExOL, SHAREOWNERSHIP 1985, at 3 (1986); NEW YoRK STOCK EXCH., 
SHAREOWNERSHIP 1990, at 10 (1991). 
58. The NYSE further elaborated: 
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income for the adult U.S. population in that year.s9 A NYSE study 
further elaborated: "While the average number of stocks in the 
mid-1990 median portfolio was 3.2 ... most shareholders engaged 
in little buying and selling activity. For the year mid-1989 to mid-
1990, three out of five investors had one transaction or less; only 
14.9% had six transactions or more."60 
These data suggest that a considerably greater number of unso-
phisticated individual investors trade today than did so in the early 
1930s. What is notable about individual investor trading activity is 
the extent to which it has diversified in the recent past, apparently 
largely in response to tax considerations. An exhibit to the SEC's 
Market 2000 study illustrates: 
Allocation of Household Liguid Financial Assets 
(not including pension fund reserves)61 
1970 1980 1992 
Liquid Fmancial Assets (Billions) $1,453 $3,115 $8,164 
Bank Deposits and CDs 37.4% 48.6% 35.4% 
Equities 47.0% 35.7% 31.1% 
U.S. Govt. Securities 6.9% 7.7% 11.0% 
Mutual Fund Shares 3.1% 1.7% 8.0% 
Muni Bonds 3.2% 3.3% 7.3% 
MM Funds 2.1% 5.7% 
Corporate Bonds 2.3% 1.0% 1.6% 
Nonetheless, when "risk-free" or near "risk-free" investments 
are removed from this chart, the enduring significance of equities, 
generally the riskiest type of security, is evident. 
Stock Portfolio Size of Individual Shareowners 
Size % of Total 
Under $5,000 34.5% 
$5,000 - $9,999 12.8% 
$10,000 - $24,999 20.9% 
$25,000 - $49,999 11.8% 
$50,000 - $99,000 9.6% 
$100,000 and over 10.4% 
NEW YORK STOCK EXCH., SHAREOWNERSHIP 1990, at 19 {1991). 
59. Id. at 18. 
60. Id. at 19. 
61. This information is taken from DIVISION OF Mlcr. REo., SEC, MARKET 2000: AN 
EXAMINATION OF CuRRENT EQUITY MARKET DEVELOPMENTS ex. 2 {1994) [hereinafter 
MARKET 2000]. 
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Allocation of Household Liquid Financial Assets 
(not including pension fund res~rves, bank deposits and CDs, 
U.S. Government securities, and MM funds) 
1970 1992 
Equities 












A second principal factor in transforming the factual context of 
federal securities regulation is internationalization. In 1987, U.S. 
investors purchased and sold $187 billion of foreign stocks, while 
foreign investors purchased and sold $481.5 billion of U.S. stocks.62 
In contrast, as recently as 1975, U.S. investors purchased and sold a 
mere $3.3 billion of foreign stock; in that year foreign investors 
purchased and sold over $26 billion of U.S. stock.63 
A variety of mechanisms facilitated this rapid increase in cross-
border trading activity. By October 1987, it was estimated that ap-
proximately 800 foreign equities were traded on the London Inter-
national Stock Exchange, of which approximately 200 were actively 
traded.64 An increasing number of both U.S. and overseas broker-
age firms are foreign controlled. In 1986, for example, the General 
Accounting Office {GAO) estimated that 30 of the approximately 
600 NYSE members were foreign controlled.65 
Cross-border stock investment is further facilitated by signifi-
cantly improved computer and telecommunications technology. As 
the Brady Report stated in January 1988, "The communications 
networks of four key data providers alone cover over 100,000 equi-
62. Offshore Offers & Sales, Securities Act Release No. 33-6779, 41 SEC Docket (CCH) 
126, 131 (June 10, 1988). 
63. SECURITIES & EXCH. CoMM., STAFF REPORT ON lNTERNATIONAUZATION OF THE SE-
CURITIES MARKETs II-73 (1987) [hereinafter REPORT ON lNTERNATIONAUZATION]. 
In 1994, the SEC staff reported that approximately 17 million shares in U.S. securities 
were traded in after-hours or off-share trading each day. MARKET 2000, supra note 61, at 
VII-1. Approximately seven million of these shares were "faxed" abroad for execution 
outside of the United States each day. After-hours trading in the United States, in contrast, 
involves foreign investors forwarding orders in U.S. securities to U.S. securities markets for 
execution after the nonnal trading hours. Id. at VII-5 to VII-9. 
Neither the "fax market" nor the initial steps toward 24-hour-a-day trading has yet had a 
significant impact on U.S. securities trading. 
64. Robert Aderhold et al., International Linkages among Equities Markets and the Octo-
ber 1987 Market Break, 13 FED. REsERVE BANK N.Y. Q. REv. 34, 37 (Summer 1988). 
65. GAO, SECURITIES AND FuruREs: How nm MARKETs DEVELOPED AND How THEY 
ARE REGULATED 17 (1986). 
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ties, connect over 110 exchanges and include 300,000 terminals in 
over 110 countries."66 Still in an incipient phase are stock market-
to-market international linkages.67 These mechanisms have in-
creasingly made it possible to shift funds from country to country in 
order to take advantage of changes in national corporate price-to-
earnings ratios, interest rate levels, currency exchange rates, and 
other fundamental factors. 68 
Concomitant with the increased levels of cross-border equity in-
vestment has been a significant decline in the overall share of U.S. 
stock markets, measured in terms of capitalization. Between 1978 
and 1986, U.S. stock markets declined from 51.6% to 42.6% of 
world stock market capitalization. During these same years, Japan, 
the second-ranked nation by stock market capitalization, increased 
from 19.4% to 29.1 %.69 These data are not particularly stable. In 
1989, the U.S. stock markets were responsible for 30.1 % of world 
capitalization; Japan was the leader with 37.7%.1° 
If the present trend toward internationalization of the securities 
markets continues, it ultimately will become commonplace for se-
curities to be distributed simultaneously in the United States and 
abroad. 
What is most striking at the current time, however, is the 
number of fundamental differences in regulatory approach that ex-
ist between the United States and other nations with sophisticated 
66. BRADY REPORT, supra note 52, at 9-10. "Reuters has developed an Integrated Digi-
tal Network known as Equities 2000 that provides real-time prices on more than 100,000 
stocks, bonds, mutual funds, futures and options traded on more than 137 exchanges world-
wide." Joseph A. Grundfest, International Cooperation in Securities Enforcement: A New 
United States Initiative, Address at King's College, London, England 10 (Nov. 9, 1988). 
67. See 5 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 1, at 2567-70. 
68. See, e.g., BRADY REPORT, supra note 52, at I (discussing market activity in the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and Japan from 1982-87). 
Id. 
69. REPORT ON INTERNATIONAUZATION, supra note 63, at 11-12. 
70. MARKET 2000, supra note 61, ex. 6. This exhibit generalized: 
Global Equity Markets Capitalization 
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securities markets. A 1985 SEC staff study, for example, compared 
the distribution systems and statutory and regulatory requirements 
of the United Kingdom and certain provinces of Canada with those 
in the United States for foreign issuers registering securities with 
the SEC on the then-most-basic form for foreign issuers, Form F-
1.71 
The staff survey found several material differences: First, Can-
ada and the United States were reported to have similar securities 
distribution or underwriting methods. At that time, neither the 
United Kingdom nor Canada generally provided for "shelf registra-
tion."72 Underwriting methods in the United Kingdom were strik-
ingly different from those used in the United States and Canada.73 
Second, substantial differences existed among the United King-
dom, Canada, and the United States with respect to required disclo-
sure relating to the nature and character of the issuer, its business, 
and its management.74 
Third, basic differences existed among the United Kingdom, 
Canada, and the United States in each jurisdiction's generally ac-
cepted accounting principles and in the requirements to reconcile 
financial statements of foreign issuers.1s 
Fourth, comparatively, the United States had the most compre-
hensive liability provision concerning the sale of securities.16 
71. Facilitation of Multinational Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 33-6568, 
32 SEC Docket (CCH) 707, 709-11(Feb.28, 1985). 
72. Id. at 709. Shelf registration allows an issuer of securities to complete the formalities 
of staff review of a registration statement and then to place securities "on the shelf," from 
where, in a relatively short period of time, they can be taken down and sold to the public. 
Because shelf registration gives an issuer greater control over when an issue will be sold to 
the public, it has proven very popular. See infra text accompanying notes 160-72. 
73. 32 SEC Docket (CCH) at 709-10. 
74. As noted in the SEC's 1985 Release, 
[A]ll three countries require disclosure of the nature of the issuer's business. In the 
United States, Regulation S-K provides specific guidelines as to what should be dis-
closed. In the United Kingdom and Canada, however, only a general instruction is given 
(e.g., describe the issuer's business) without providing further guidance as to the specific 
facts which may be material to an understanding of the issuer's business (e.g., backlog of 
customer orders or sources and availability of raw materials). Other notable differences 
among the jurisdictions surveyed include, but are not limited to: · variations in the re-
quirements for Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Re-
sults of Operations; disclosure of industry segment data; and disclosure of management's 
business experience, remuneration, and its beneficial ownership of securities of the 
issuer. 
Id. at 710. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 710-11. To date, the SEC has achieved only limited success in encouraging 
multijurisdictional issuances with its adoption in 1991 of a multijurisdictional disclosure sys-
tem, limited to the United States and Canada. See Multijurisdictional Disclosure and Modifi-
cation to the Current Registration and Reporting System for Canadian Issuers, Securities Act 
Release No. 33-6902, 49 SEC Docket (CCH) 260 (June 21, 1991). 
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Finally, somewhat later in 1992, SEC Chairman Richard 
Breeden called attention to what were then unbridgeable differ-
ences between the United States and other nations that were mem-
bers of the International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO) in minimum capital required of broker-dealers.77 
To some extent, these types of differences are inevitable. The 
United States has a larger number - and a larger percentage - of 
individual investors than any other nation. Its securities law re-
quirements are generally more demanding because of the weaker 
ability of individual investors to bargain for the type of information 
that in the United States is mandatorily disclosed. 
At the same time, however, as other national securities markets 
evolve, the ability of the SEC or Congress to insist on our securities 
regulatory requirements has lessened. It is not inevitable either 
that U.S. or foreign issuers sell securities in the United States or 
that U.S. investors buy here. Ultimately, the trend toward interna-
tionalization of securities transactions may pose a type of "Rob-
son's choice" for U.S. securities regulation: either there will be an 
insistence on maintenance of traditional standards to protect indi-
vidual investors, with the risk that U.S. securities issuers will in-
creasingly sell abroad and foreign issuers will not sell here, or there 
will be a lessening of the stringency of U.S. mandatory require-
ments with greater risks for individual investors. But this type of 
choice so far has resulted in only limited significant changes in the 
mandatory disclosure system.78 It is as yet uncertain whether for-
eign issuers will generally comply with the more demanding U.S. 
disclosure requirements to secure access to our markets or whether 
the United States will need to sacrifice standards to ensure that se-
curities trading will remain here. 
77. In a letter of October 21, 1992, SEC Chairman Breeden discussed deficiencies in the 
"building block" approach to capital adequacy used by IOSCO: 
Speaking from the point of view of the [SEC), we have come to the conclusion that 
the building block approach will not yield sufficient levels of capital to protect markets 
in the face of major disruptions. At its most extreme, the approach currently under 
consideration would allow capital levels of 2 percent for highly liquid equities that are 
part of a diversified portfolio and are offset by unrelated equities on the opposite side. 
The SEC rule would require capital equal to 15 percent of long positions plus 30 percent 
of the excess of short positions over 25 percent of long positions. The SEC is not pre-
pared to accept 2 percent, and other members have made clear that they will not accept 
15 percent 
SEC Letter to IOSCO on Capital Adequacy, 5 ImL SEC. REo. REP., Nov. 3, 1992, at 11, 11. 
The IOSCO subsequently abandoned its efforts to reach a compromise on this issue. IOSCO 
Panel Drops Compromise Effort Regarding Global Capital Standards, 25 Sec. Reg. & L. 
Rep. (BNA) 216 (Feb. 12, 1993). See generally Nancy Worth, Harmonizing Capital Adequacy 
Rules for International Banks and Securities Firms, 18 N.C. J. INTL. L. & CoM. REo. 133 
(1992). 
78. See infra text accompanying notes 146-97. 
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C. Computerization 
Much of the recent history of the stock markets involves the 
transition from manual to computer transactions.79 This transition 
became a matter of regulatory concern in the late 1960s, when 
nearly two hundred broker-dealer firms that were members of the 
NYSE experienced difficulties with clearance and settlement - or 
"back office" - operations as a result of a volume surge from 4.89 
million shares per day in 1964 to 14.9 million shares in December 
1968, aggravated by often self-defeating efforts to engage in "in-
stant computerization" of back offices.so In the early 1970s, over-
the-counter trading was revolutionized by the replacement of the 
daily pink sheets with the NASDAQ electronic system, which per-
mits brokers to read up-to-the-minute marketmakers' quotations 
from desk top terminals.81 Other computer information systems 
such as Autex and Instinet permit institutional investors to commu-
nicate directly - off the exchange floor - their interest in buying 
or selling blocks of securities.sz 
Computers have also performed a significant role in order exe-
cution. Several exchanges, led by the NYSE, use telecommunica-
tions to forward orders to specialists, replacing manual transmission 
by floor brokers.83 The Intermarket Trading System (ITS) similarly 
links several stock exchanges and the NASD.84 More elaborate 
proposals to create a national market system with system-wide 
computerized order execution have thus far not been realized,85 
although a largely unsuccessful experiment with computerized or-
der execution has been conducted on the Cincinnati Stock Ex-
change since the late 1970s.s6 
In recent years, the computer has performed an increasingly sig-
nificant role in order origination. Index arbitrage87 would not be 
79. See Lewis D. Solomon & Louise Corso, The Impact of Technology on the Trading of 
Securities: The Emerging Global Market and the Implications for Regulation, 24 J. MAR-
SHALL L. RE.v. 299 (1991). 
80. See SEUGMAN, supra note 18, at 450-66. 
81. 5 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 1, at 2580-84; SEUGMAN, supra note 18, at 353, 490-
95. 
82. For further discussion of Autex and Instinet, see 5 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 1, at 
2577-78. 
83. See 5 id. at 2554-64 (discussing several order execution systems). 
84. For a discussion of the background of ITS, see 5 id. at 2564-67. 
85. See SEUGMAN, supra note 18, at 524-25, 531-34. 
86. For a discussion of the Cincinnati Stock Exchange, see 5 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra 
note 1, at 2562-64. 
87. Index arbitrage exploits the price differences between a stock index future, such as 
the S&P 500, and the composite value of the underlying stocks. 5 id. at 2648. 
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possible without computers to identify spreads between futures and 
the cash market. Portfolio insurance88 uses computers to generate 
orders employing technical trading rules. Today, computers can 
print order tickets, submit orders, clear transactions, and maintain 
records virtually simultaneously. Federal Reserve Chairman Alan 
Greenspan is hardly alone in observing that "[t]he speed of infor-
mation flow together with institutionalization of equity holdings im-
ply that new information can very promptly induce a heavy 
imbalance of orders on one side or the other of the market."89 
D. Financial Economics 
It is by now a thrice-told tale that investment management has 
been transformed by modem :financial economics.90 In the simplest 
sense, the combination of the efficient market hypothesis,91 warts 
88. 
"Portfolio insurance" is a term that refers to a number of dynamic hedging strategies to 
limit losses in a stock market during a market decline. A typical program might attempt 
to ensure a minimum of 95 percent of a current portfolio's value. When a market index 
such as the S&P 500 declines to a trigger point, a computer might generate an order to 
sell S&P 500 stock index futures as a technique to ensure against further declines. Port· 
folio insurance is not free. The SEC Staff reported that the cost of maintenance of a 
minimum of 95% of a current portfolio's value 'was estimated to be potentially un-
derperforming a rising market by two to four percent.' DIVISION OF MKT. REG., SEC, 
THE OCTOBER 1987 MARKET BREAK 1-3 {1988). But if an institution is willing to pay 
that price, it can participate in any market advance (net of the cost of the stock index 
futures) and 'insure' a portfolio against broad market declines. 
5 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 1, at 2650-52. 
89. The Conclusions and Recommendations of the President's "Working Group on Finan-
cial Markets": Hearing before Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, lOOth 
Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1988) {statement of Chairman Alan Greenspan); see also D1vrs10N OF 
Micr. REG., SEC, THE RoLE OF INDEX-RELATED TRADING IN THE MARKET DECUNB OF 
SEPTEMBER 11 AND 12, 1986, at 20 (Mar. 1987). 
90. For illustrative accounts of this saga, see PETER L. BERNSTEIN, CAPITAL IDEAS! THE 
IMPROBABLE ORIGINS OF MODERN WALL STREET {1992); JAMES H. LoRIB BT AL, THE 
STOCK MARKET: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1985); BURTON G. MALKIBL, A RAN-
DOM w ALK DOWN WALL STREET (5th ed. 1990). For a leading academic work, see RICHARD 
A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CoRPORATB FINANCE {4th ed. 1991). 
91. A market in which prices generally reflect available information is called "efficient." 
To the extent that securities prices "instantly" or rapidly adjust to new information, the op-
portunities for investors to outtrade the market is eliminated or reduced. It is generally be· 
lieved that at least the most actively traded securities are traded in informationally efficient 
markets because of such mechanisms as computerized quotation and information systems 
and competition among financial analysts and brokerage house research departments. See, 
e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 10 VA. 
L. REV. 549 (1984). 
The SEC explicitly relied on the efficient market hypothesis in adopting its integrated 
disclosure system, as well as Rule 415, its "shelf registration" rule. See, e.g., Shelf Registra· 
tion, Securities Act Release No. 33-6499, 29 SEC Docket (CCH} 169, 171-77 (Nov. 29, 1983}. 
Sinlilarly, the Supreme Court implicitly deferred to the hypothesis in securities fraud litiga· 
tion when it held that the element of reliance in cases involving Exchange Act § lO(b}, 15 
U.S.C. § 77j(b} (1988), could be presumed by dint of the concept of fraud on the market, 
which holds that market prices reflect publicly available information, including credible false 
information. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-49 (1988). 
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and all,92 and portfolio theory93 have generally triumphed in defeat-
92. The efficient market hypothesis does not prove that securities are correctly priced. 
As one federal district court aptly put it: , 
[F]air market price ••. may unfortunately and inaccurately suggest that application of 
the fraud-on-the-market theory requires proof that the market correctly reflects some 
"fundamental value" of the security. To apply the fraud-on-the-market theory, it is suffi-
cient that the market for a security be "efficient" only in the sense that market prices 
reflect the available information about the security. 
In re Verifone Sec. Litig., 784 F. Supp. 1471, 1478-79 n.7 (N.D. Cal. 1992) {citations omitted), 
affd., 11 F.3d 865 (9th Cir. 1993). 
Commentators have raised other, ofteri quite substantial, concerns about the efficient 
market hypothesis. These include the following: 
(i) The Efficiency Paradox: As Grossman and Stiglitz urge, a perfectly efficient market is 
impossible because securities analysts and other market professionals cannot be expected to 
gather information beyond the point at which they can earn a positive return. Hence the 
norm should be an "equilibrium level of disequilibrium," in which securities prices reflect 
new information rapidly, but not' so quickly that market professionals cannot earn a positive 
return. See Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally 
Efficient Markets, 70 AM. EcoN. REv. 393 {1980). Professor Jensen also makes this point: A 
market is efficient when prices reflect information to the point where the marginal benefits of 
acting on information - the profits to be made - do not exceed the marginal costs. See 
Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: II, 46 J. FIN. 1575, 1575 {1991) {discussing 
Jensen's efficiency hypothesis and citing Michael C. Jensen, Some Anomalous Evidence Re-
garding Market Efficiency, 6 J. FIN. EcoN. 95, 96-W {1978)). 
(ii) Noise Theory: As articulated in a much-cited article by Andrei Shleifer and 
Lawrence Summers: 
Our approach rests on two assumptions. Fust, some investors are not fully rational and 
their demand for risky assets is .affected by their beliefs or sentiments that are not fully 
justified by fundamental news. Second, arbitrage - defined as trading by fully rational 
investors not subject to such sentiment - is risky and therefore limited. The two as-
sumptions together imply that changes in investor sentiment are not fully countered by 
arbitragers and so affect security returns. We argue that this approach to financial mar-
kets is in many ways superior to the efficient market paradigm. 
Our case for the noise trader approach is threefold. First, theoretical models with 
limited arbitrage are both tractable and more plausible than models with perfect arbi-
trage. The efficient market hypothesis obtains only as an extreme case of perfect riskless 
arbitrage that is unlikely to apply in practice. Second, the investor sentiment/limited 
arbitrage approach yields a more accurate description of financial markets than the effi-
cient markets paradigm. The approach not only explains the available anomalies, but 
also readily explains broad features of financial markets such as trading volume and 
actual investment strategies. Third, and most importantly, this approach yields new and 
testable implications about asset prices, some of which have been proved to be consis-
tent with the data. It is absolutely not true that introducing a degree of irrationality of 
some investors into models of financial markets "eliminates all discipline and can explain 
anything." 
Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, The Noise Trader Approach to Finance, J. EcoN. 
l'ERsPECTIVES, Spring 1990, at 19, 20. For the work of an earlier noise theorist who focused 
extensively on excess price volatility, see ROBERT J. SHILLER, MARKET VoLATIUTY (1989). 
For the work of a legal scholar who posits that once we assume heterogenous investor beliefs, 
we have broken the link between stock market price efficiency and the fundamental value of 
a firm, see Lynn A. Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really Premiums? Market Price, Fair 
Value, and Corporate Law, 99 YALE LJ. 1235, 1245-48, 1286-88, 1292-95 {1990). 
{iii) The Joint Hypothesis Testing Problem: Professor Langevoort has urged that "[i]n the 
1980s, using more sophisticated data sets and computer technology, a number of economists 
began to question the accuracy of the tests that were thought to validate the efficiency 
model," to the point where "theorists began seriously to question whether the efficient mar-
ket model could ever really be validated or discredited." Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, 
Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L REv. 851, 
853-54 (1992); see also Thomas Lee Hazen, The Short-Term/Long-Term Dichotomy and In-
vestment Theory: Implications for Securities Market Regulation and for Corporate Law, 70 
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ing the earlier, quite popular belief that shrewd investors could 
"outtrade the market" by careful study of fundamental economic 
data. 
One practical consequence of modem financial economics has 
been to change the emphasis of investment advice. Because, at 
N.C. L REv. 137 (1991); cf. Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of "Inaccu-
rate" Stock Prices, 41 DuKE LJ. 977 (1992). 
Professor Fama celebrated the twentieth anniversary of his initial literature survey on the 
efficient market hypothesis with a new resume of the by-then "thornier" literature. See 
Fama, supra. He emphatically defended the theory: 
Ambiguity about information and trading costs is not, however, the main obstacle to 
inferences about market efficiency. The joint-hypothesis problem is more serious. Thus, 
market efficiency per se is not testable. It must be tested jointly with some model of 
equilibrium, an asset-pricing model. This point, the theme of the 1970 review, says that 
we can only test whether information is properly reflected in prices in the context of a 
pricing model that defines the meaning of "properly." As a result, when we find anoma-
lous evidence on the behavior of returns, the way it should be split between market 
inefficiency or a bad model of market equilibrium is ambiguous. 
Does the fact that market efficiency must be tested jointly with an equilibrium-
pricing model make empirical research on efficiency uninteresting? Does the joint-
hypothesis problem make empirical work on asset-pricing models uninteresting? These 
are, after all, symmetric questions, with the same answer. My answer is an unequivocal 
no. The empirical literature on efficiency and asset-pricing models passes the acid test of 
scientific usefulness. It has changed our views about the behavior of returns, across se-
curities and through time. Indeed, academics largely agree on the facts that emerge 
from the tests, even when they disagree about their implications for efficiency. The em-
pirical work on market efficiency and asset-pricing models has also changed the views 
and practices of market professionals. 
Id. at 1575-76 (citation omitted). 
Less sanguine is Fischer Black, who has argued that a reasonable definition of an efficient 
market is "one in which price is within a factor of 2 of value, i.e., the price is more than half 
of value and less than twice value." Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529, 533 (1986). 
93. Portfolio theory divides the risk of each portfolio of securities into alpha risk -
nonmarket or firm-specific risk - and beta risk - sensitivity of the portfolio to movements 
of an overall market Because virtually all of a portfolio's alpha risk can be diversified away, 
modem portfolio management has long focused on what degree of beta or market risk is 
appropriate. For example, a high-risk or "performance" portfolio might move 15% each 
time the market as a whole moves 10%, thus having a beta of 1.5, while a low-risk portfolio 
might move 7 5% and have a beta of .75. 
In effect, portfolio theory transforms the logic of investment analysis. Rather than study-
ing individual securities for bargains, the focus is on calculation of risk levels. In a period in 
which a securities market rises, the assembling of a high-beta portfolio offers one technique 
by which you can outtrade the market 
The leading work on this theory has long been WILUAM F. SHARPE, POR1FOUO THEORY 
AND CAPITAL MARKETS (1970). Portfolio theory depends upon the accurate prediction of 
beta. Historical stock price data are obviously of value in making beta predictions. But there 
is controversy as to whether such predictions are likely to be as accurate as beta predictions 
based both on stock price data and on fundamental information about the specific securities 
held in a portfolio. See Barr Rosenberg & James Guy, Prediction of Beta from Investment 
Fundamentals: Part One, FIN. ANALYsrs J., May-June 1976, at 60 [hereinafter Rosenberg & 
Guy, Part One]; Barr Rosenberg & James Guy, Prediction of Beta from Investment Funda-
mentals: Part 1Wo, FIN. ANALYSI'S J., July-Aug. 1976, at 62 [hereinafter Rosenberg & Guy, 
Part 1Wo. Rosenberg and Guy have argued that "[b]ecause the portfolio revision decision 
entails the sale of specific securities within the portfolio and the purchase of others, it be-
comes necessary to predict the betas of individual securities." Rosenberg & Guy, Part One, 
supra, at 69. Barr Rosenberg and Vmay Marathe's studies of firm "fundamental variables ••• 
were substantially better predictors (of risk) than the historical beta in the sense that they 
achieved a smaller measurement error.'' Rosenberg & Guy, Part 1Wo, supra, at 68. 
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least in theory, it is no longer possible to outtrade the market, there 
have evolved a wide variety of techniques for risk management. 
For individual investors, this has stimulated a gradual increase in 
mutual funds rather than in individual equities.94 For institutional 
investors this has triggered interest in, among other techniques, 
overseas investment to achieve international diversification,9s and 
portfolio insurance to hedge against portfolio price declines.96 
What is most intriguing about the recent past, however, is the 
extent to which :financial risk management has more generally per-
meated corporate :finance. During the past two decades, two 
strands of this development have been most evident. The first such 
strand, "securitization," involves the transformation of illiquid debt 
into securities.97 Through 1991, over $900 billion in government 
and private mortgages had been "securitized" and offered to inves-
tors through various forms of "structured :financings. "98 For banks 
and other traditional mortgage lenders, mortgage-backed securities 
offer significant opportunities for risk reduction. Their assets are 
now more liquid, or easily resalable, and their loan portfolios can 
be more fully diversified in terms of geography or loan categories.99 
Second has been the growing use by non:financial business corpora-
tions of derivative :financial instruments to hedge risk. There are 
three general categories of derivatives: futures, options, and swaps. 
94. See supra text and chart accompanying note 61. Between 1970 and 1992, mutual 
funds increased from 3.1 % to 8.0% of household liquid financial assets; during the same 
period, individual investment in equities declined from 47% to 31.l %. Id. 
95. See supra text accompanying note 62. 
96. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. In 1993, program trading techniques aver-
aged 11.9% of the trading volume on the NYSE. MARKET 2000, supra note 61, ex. 23. Port-
folio insurance apparently accounted for well over half of that total. See id. exs. 26-27. 
97. See generally TAMAR FRANKEL, SECURITIZATION: STRUCTURED FINANCING, FINAN-
CIAL ASSET POOLS, AND AssET-BACKED SECURITIES (1991). 
98. 1 FRANKEL, supra note 97, at 39; cf. Exclusion from the Definition of Investment 
Company for Certain Structured Financings, Investment Co. Act of 1940, Release No. IC-
18736, 51 SEC Docket (CCH) 940, 942 (May 29, 1992) ("Structured financings backed by 
residential mortgages dominate the structured finance market; in 1991, publicly offered 
mortgage-backed securities issuances in the United States totalled approximately $246.21 bil-
lion, or eighty-four percent of the structured finance market."). 
99. There are other advantages. As Professor Frankel has generalized: 
Securitization also enables the holder of loans to raise funds at a lower cost than had 
it borrowed on its own credit. Some loans may have a higher credit rating than the 
credit of the holder, and investors will demand lower returns for securities backed by 
such loans. Opportunities for profit have mobilized the securities industry to develop 
securitization techniques. Legal requirements, such as capital requirements, induced 
banks to sell their assets, reduce their short-term liabilities, and thereby increase their 
equity and long-term debt. Thus, for holders of loans, securitization can lower the cost 
of funding, and for banks, it can also reduce the costs of legally required capital. 
1 FRANKEL, supra note 97, at 40. 
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The initial type of derivative was the agricultural futures con-
tract. In traditional agricultural markets, a futures contract pro-
vided for the future delivery of a specified quantity of a particular 
commodity on a specified delivery date, using prices suggested by 
the current price. Thus a farmer might enter into a futures contract 
to sell a stated quantity of wheat due to be harvested in a distant 
month, using a current price. This protects the farmer against a 
price drop, while at the same time depriving the farmer of an addi-
tional profit if wheat prices should rise. Similarly, a grain merchant 
or a speculator might enter into a contract to buy a stated quantity 
of wheat in the same distant month, using a current price. The 
grain merchant, like the farmer, might attempt to hedge against fu-
ture price rises while conceding the ability to buy at a lower price if 
wheat prices fall.100 More recently, active futures markets have 
been established for such :financial futures as foreign currencies, 
government securities, and stock indexes.101 
Trading in individual stock options predates the SEC. Initially 
options were typically called "puts" and "calls": 
A put is an option to sell at a certain price within a certain period, and 
a call is a similar option to buy. The economic raison d'etre of these 
options is to serve as a hedge (a form of insurance) against future 
market movements. For example, a person who [owns stock might] 
buy a put as insurance that he will be able to sell if the market falls to 
a certain level . . . .102 
Until 1973, these instruments were generally written in bearer form 
by more-or-less professional investors, endorsed by stock exchange 
houses, and then bought and sold in the over-the-counter 
market.103 
Trading in securities options underwent a radical change after 
the creation of the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) in 
1973, soon followed by options trading on the American, Philadel-
phia, and Pacific Stock Exchanges, with the New York Stock Ex-
100. The speculator, in contrast, might simply be gambling that he or she can better pre-
dict future price movements than the current market price does. Regarding futures, see gen-
erally 5 Lo5s & SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 2634-52. 
101. See generally 1 PHruP McBRIDE JOHNSON & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, COMMODITIES 
REGULATION § 1.01 (2d ed. 1989). 
102. 2 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 1066. See generally 2 id. at 1064-72; 5 id. at 
2602-34. 
103. Almost all of this trading was done in New York by some 20 members of the Put and 
Call Brokers and Dealers Association, a purely voluntary association that adopted rules for 
the conduct of the business and that polices the affairs of its members. See Vandervelde v. 
Put & Call Brokers & Dealers Assn., 344 F. Supp. 118, 125-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (antitrust 
action); DIVISION OF TRADING & ExCHS., SEC, REPORT ON PUT AND CALL OPTIONS (1961). 
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change joining the fray in 1982.104 The CBOE pioneered two 
concepts: "(1) contract standardization so that options were made 
fungible by fixing the exercise months and exercise ("striking") 
prices, and (2) establishment (and now joint ownership by all the 
options exchanges) of The Options Clearing Corporation (OCC), 
which is the issuer as well as the guarantor of the traded 
options. "105 
Currently there are four basic types of listed options traded by 
options exchanges: stock options, stock index options, debt op-
tions, and foreign currency options.106 Futures and options are fed-
erally regulated respectively by the Commodities Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC) and the SEC. Financial swaps, in contrast, are 
not.107 
Professor Hu has explained interest rate and currency swaps:· 
In its most basic form, an interest rate swap involves: (1) one 
party (typically called the "fixed rate payor") agreeing to make peri-
odic payments to the other party which are fixed in amount in return 
for {b) the other party (typically called the "floating rate payor" or 
the "variable rate payor") agreeing to make periodic payments to the 
first party that vary with the "prime rate," "LIBOR," or some other 
benchmark of market interest rates. The payments exchanged by the 
parties are analogous to interest payments on a purely hypothetical 
principal amount (typically called "notional principal amount" or 
"notional amount"). No payments analogous to principal payments 
are made. 
With interest rate swaps, the parties never make any paymentS of 
principal. The only payments made can be characterized as de facto 
interest payments on a purely hypothetical principal amount. With 
the currency swap, however, there are exchanges of both interest and 
principal. By carefully structuring these exchanges, parties can hedge 
against both currency and interest rate fluctuations. The currency 
swap also may offer arbitrage possibilities. If a company has a com-
parative advantage in the fixed interest rate Deutsche mark capital 
market but prefers floating rate United States dollars, it could reduce 
its borrowing costs through a currency swap. The company can bor-
row in the fixed rate Deutsche mark capital market and then, through 
a currency swap, transform the fixed rate Deutsche marks to floating 
104. See Exchange Act Releases Nos. 19125-19134, 26 SEC Docket (CCH) 464, 464-92 
(Oct. 14, 1982) . 
105. 2 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 1, at 1067-68 (citations omitted). 
106. See 5 id. at 2602-34. 
107. See generally Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Informa-
tional Failure and the Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457 (1993) 
[hereinafter Hu, Derivatives]; Henry T.C. Hu, Swaps, the Modem Process of Financial Inno-
vation and the Vulnerability of a Regulatory Paradigm, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 333 (1989) [herein-
after Hu, Swaps]. 
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rate United States dollars. Obtaining such funds indirectly can be 
cheaper than doing so directly.1os 
Swaps are largely outside the scope of existing securities and 
futures regulation. But the April 1994 announcement by Procter & 
Gamble that it would take a $102 million loss on a complex swap109 
reenforced earlier concerns about the solvency risks of the banks 
that are the principal dealers in swap transactions.110 By August 
1994, a total loss of as much as $6.4 billion in derivatives was re-
ported in the popular press.111 
E. Conclusion 
In fine, the context of securities regulation is progressively more 
rapidly changing. Each of these factors works simultaneously -
meaning, for example, that a change in computer technology can 
rapidly inspire changes in financial products and international order 
origination. Against this background, the current boundaries of 
federal securities law are often called into question. 
108. Hu, Swaps, supra note 107, at 347, 353 (citations omitted). 
109. Kelley Holland et al., A Black Hole in the Balance Sheet, Bus. WK., May 16, 1994, at 
80. 
110. See, e.g., OCC Banking Circular 277, Risk Management of F'mancial Derivatives, 5 
Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 'I 58,717 (Oct 27, 1993); Group _of Thirty Report Recommends 
Methods to Manage Derivatives Activity, 25 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1042, 1043 (July 30, 
1993). 
In the United States, Congressman Leach published a 900-page report on financial deriv-
atives, including several recommendations. The CFfC has independently recommended an 
interagency council to study over-the-counter derivatives further. Gonzalez Bill Would Force 
Banks to Disclose More Derivatives Data, 26 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 544 (Apr. 15, 1994); 
Levitt Tells House Banking Panel SEC ls Seeking Data on Hedge Funds, 26 Sec. Reg. & L. 
Rep. (BNA) 539 (Apr. 15, 1994); Rep. Leach's Derivatives Study Cal/J for More Regulation 
and Accountability, 25 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1608 (Dec. 3, 1993); Rep. Leach In-
troduces Derivatives Bill for All Financial Institutions, End-Users, 26 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 
(BNA) 168 (Feb. 4, 1994}; see also Thomas L. Friedman, Soros Gives House Panel Hedge 
Fund Lesson, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 14, 1994, at Cl. 
In 1994, the SEC, the CFfC, and the British Securities & Investment Board issued a joint 
statement on OTC Derivatives Oversight Statement of the Securities Exchange Commis-
sion, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, and the Securities and Investments 
Board, Intl. Series, Release No. IS-642, 56 SEC Docket (CCH) 759 (Mar. 15, 1994). The 
statement identified the following joint concerns: (i) exchanges of information, (ii) netting 
arrangements, (iii) capital standards, (iv) management controls, (v) customer protection, (vi) 
multilateral credit risk management arrangements, and (vii) accounting standards. Subse-
quently, the F'mancial Accounting Standards Board (FASB} also issued an exposure draft. 
FASB Issues Proposed Statement Requiring More Derivative Disclosure, 26 Sec. Reg. & L. 
Rep. (BNA} 602 (Apr. 22, 1994). 
111. Randall Smith & Steven Lipin, Beleaguered Giant: As Derivatives Losses Rise, In-
dustry Fights To Avert Regulation, WAIL ST. J., Aug. 25, 1994, at Al. See generally COMMOD-
ITY FUTURES TRADING CoMMN., OTC DERIVATIVE MARKETs AND THEIR REGULATION 
(1993); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES: AcnoNS NEEDED TO 
PROTECT TiiE FINANCIAL SYSTEM (1994). 
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II. BOUNDARY lssUES 
A. State Securities Regulation 
[In 19il,] the failure of lax state corporation statutes to prevent secur-
ities fraud gave rise to the first significant legislative response when 
Kansas enacted the first well-known state securities law, popularly 
known as a "blue sky" law, since it was intended to check stock swin-
dlers so barefaced they "would sell building lots in the blue sky."112 
By its terms, the Kansas statute provided that no investment 
company could sell securities in Kansas until it filed a description of 
its operations with the bank commissioner and received a permit. 
The bank commissioner was given broad discretion not to grant a 
permit if he found any aspect of a company's business to be "unfair, 
unjust, inequitable or oppressive to any class of contributors, or if 
he decides from his examination of its affairs that said investment 
company is not solvent and does not intend to do a fair and honest 
business, and in his judgment does not promise a fair return on the 
stocks, bonds or other securities by it offered for sale."113 
This type of statute is popularly known today as "merit regula-
tion" because it vests an administrator with the ability to block the 
marketing of a security when he finds it to be "unfair, unjust, ineq-
uitable, or oppressive." After the Kansas-type blue sky law was 
held constitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1917,114 the blue 
sky movement swept the country. By 1933, every state except Ne-
vada had a securities law in effect.11s 
Rarely have statutes enacted with such fanfare and general sup-
port subsequently been so universally deprecated. In the brutal 
glare that followed the 1929-1932 stock market crash, it was appar-
ent to virtually all commentators and congressional witnesses on 
the subject that the blue sky laws never really had a chance to suc-
ceed. As early as 1915, the Investment Bankers Association re-
ported to its members that they could "ignore" all blue sky laws by 
112. SEUGMAN, supra note 18, at 44-45; see also Lams Loss & EDWARD M. CoWETr, 
BLUE SKY LAW 7-10 (1958); MICHAELE. PARRISH, SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE NEW 
DEAL 5-7 (1970); cf. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 
70 TEXAS L. REv. 347 (1991) (questioning the initial need for blue sky statutes). 
113. Act of Mar. 10, 1911, ch. 133, 1911 Kan. Sess. Laws 210, 212, repealed by Act of Mar. 
16, 1929, ch. 140, 1929 Kan. Sess. Laws 212. 
114. See Merrick v. N.W. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917) (upholding Michigan's blue 
sky law); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559 {1917) (upholding South 
Dakota's blue sky law); Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 {1917) (upholding the consti-
tutionality of an Ohio blue sky law similar to that of Kansas). 
115. 1 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note l, at 39. Today all 50 states, the District of Colum-
bia, Guant, and Puerto Rico have blue sky laws in force. The individual statutes are repro-
duced by state in Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) {1992). 
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making offerings across state lines through the mails.116 Unscrupu-
lous securities promoters soon adopted the technique. A 1933 De-
partment of Commerce study found, "The most effective and 
widely used method of evading the provision of State blue sky laws 
consists in operating across State lines."111 Robert E. Healy, chief 
counsel to the Federal Trade Commission, testified before Congress 
that same year that over ninety percent of the securities sold in 
Pennsylvania were sold through the mails.118 
Nor were purely intrastate securities sales much better policed. 
Effective lobbying, principally by the Investment Bankers Associa-
tion (IBA), had riddled ·most state blue sky laws with 
exemptions.119 
Typically, an-act'might exempt the securities of all corporations listed 
on a stock exchange and all securities issued by a public utility subject 
to the regulation of a federal or state agency. The more porous stat-
utes also exempted the securities of all firms incorporated intrastate, 
bank corporations, insurance companies, investment companies, co-
operative associations, building and loan associations, [and] business 
trusts, as well as issues "guaranteed by friendly foreign governments," 
mortgage bonds and notes secured by property within the state, short-
term commercial paper, "isolated" securities transactions, one-year 
debentures, and a myriad of other types of securities or 
transactions.120 
Only eight states appropriated sufficient funds to support securi-
ties commissions that could work full time investigating suspected 
frauds and prosecuting violators. In forty states, administration of the 
blue sky act was a "football of politics" as the chairman of the Confer-
ence on Prevention of Fraudulent Transactions in Securities put it in 
1931. Enforcement responsibilities were assigned to unspecialized at-
torneys working for state officials as disparate as the railroad commis-
sion or the state auditor. When political administrations changed, 
responsibility for blue sky enforcement frequently was also 
reassigned.121 
116. PARRISH, supra note 112, at 29. 
117. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, A STUDY OF nm ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ASPBCI'S OF 
nm PROPOSED FEDERAL SECURITIES Acr, reprinted in Federal Securities Act: Hearings on 
H.lt 4314 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 
110 (1933) [hereinafter Federal Securities Act Hearings]. 
118. Federal Securities Act Hearings, supra note 117, at 228 (testimony of Robert E. 
Healy). 
119. VINCENT P. CAROSSO, INvEsTMENT BANKING IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 165-73 
(1970) (describing the formation and purpose of the IBA); PARRISH, supra note 112, at 21-28. 
120. SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 45-46 (footnote omitted); see also Federal Securities Act 
Hearings, supra note 117, at 96; FORREST BEE ASHBY, THE ECONOMIC EFFECT OF BLUE SKY 
LAws 46-47 (1926). 
121. SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 46; see also ASHBY, supra note 120, at 43-45; HOMER V. 
Cmm.RINGTON, THE INvEsToR AND nm SECURITIES Acr 56 (1942); PARRISH, supra note 
112, at 28-29. 
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Even in New York, wlµch was widely regarded as having the most 
effective blue sky agency, enforcement was inadequate. In 1932, the 
attorney general's Bureau of Securities employed more than a hun-
dred [individuals,] secured injunctions against 1522 persons and firms, 
and instituted 146 criminal prosecutions. At approximately the same 
time, officials of the New York Stock Exchange estimated that of the 
billion dollars or so of fraudulent securities annually sold in the 
United States, about half were sold in New York State.122 
After Congress enacted federal securities laws, primarily in 1933 
and 1934, the intriguing question is why did the blue sky laws en-
dure? In my view, there are three general reasons. 
First, political sentiment favored retention of a state role. The 
SEC legislation specifically preserved the blue sky laws. Far from 
preempting a field when interstate commerce is involved, Congress 
in this case affirmatively yielded to local regulation by inserting a 
number of intrastate exemptions even when the mails or facilities of 
interstate commerce are used123 and more broadly adopted provi-
sions generally "preserving the jurisdiction of the state securities 
commissions. "124 
The states' enthusiasm for these laws can in part be traced to the 
fact that blue sky laws, like corporation statutes, are implicitly tax 
statutes: "A 1984 study of reports from thirty state jurisdictions il-
lustrate[d] that in many jurisdictions blue sky laws [were] primarily 
revenue measures."125 In twenty-six of these jurisdictions, reve-
nues, largely from registration statement :filings, exceeded expenses. 
In three of these jurisdictions - Nebraska, South Dakota, and Ver-
mont - rev~nues were greater than ten times blue sky expenses; in 
six other jurisdictions - Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Minnesota, Mon-
tana, and Texas - revenues were at least five times expenses. In 
twenty-two of the thirty reporting jurisdictions, blue sky revenues 
were at least twice blue sky expenses.126 
Second, the state statutes have generally been rewritten to re-
duce compliance burdens at the state level when a securities issu-
122. SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 46. Compare Federal Securities Act Hearings, supra 
note 117, at 166 (testimony of William Breed) with C!iERruNGTON, supra note 121, at 52. 
123. See 3 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 1274-1307 (discussing the § 3(a)(ll) ex-
emption from the Securities Act of 1933). Nonetheless, commentators periodically have rec-
ommended total federal preemption of state securities laws. See, e.g., Rutherford B. 
Campbell, Jr., An Open Attack on the Nonsense of Blue Sky Regulation, 10 J. CoRP. L. 553 
(1985); see also Camey v. Hanson Oil Co., 690 S.W.2d 404 (Mo. 1985). 
124. 1 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 272. For a discussion of the provisions in the 
relevant statutes, see id. at 271-77. 
125. 1 id. at 149-50 (citing North American Securities Administrators Association 
(NASAA)). See generally 1 id. at 149-51. 
126. The following data were supplied by the NASAA: 
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ance is registered at the federal level. Today, over forty state 
jurisdictions authorize registration by coordination.121 Most of 
these jurisdictions follow the coordination procedure specified in 
section 303 of the Uniform Securities Act of 1956128 and limit this 
procedure to issuers that have filed a registration statement em-
ploying the Securities Act of 1933. In essence, 'the coordination 
procedure requires filing at the state level of copies of the registra-
tion statement filed with the SEC. If specified conditions are met, 
the registration statement automatically becomes effective at the 
state level at the moment the federal registration statement be-
comes effective.129 
Revenues Expenses 
State (in OOOs) (in OOOs) 
Ala. $ 1,668. $ 663. 
Cal. 9,139. 7,000. 
Conn. 2,280 891. 
Del. 377 112. 
Fla. 3,730. 738. 
Ga. 1,819. 748. 
Idaho 799. 152. 
Ill. 5,481. 776. 
Iowa 1,590 335. 
Kan. 918. 485. 
Ky. 1,434. 540. 
Mass. 1,236. N.A. 
Minn. 4,309. 542. 
Mont 1,589. 229. 
Neb. 2,219. 213. 
Nev. 872. N.A. 
N.D. 855. 180. 
Ohio 5,485. 2,729. 
Okla. 2,469. 904. 
Or. 1,445. 413. 
Pa. 3,101. 1,684. 
P.R. 120. 186. 
S.D. 1,443. 129. 
Tenn. 2,102. N.A. 
Tex. 10,651. 2,133. 
Utah 963. 350. 
Vt 545. 54. 
Va. 583. 762. 
Wash. 4,192. 873. 


































































See also Mark A. Sargent, Blue Sky Law: Regulation of Investment Companies -
Sources of the Current Controversy, 13 SEC. REo. LI. 167, 172 n.24 (1985) (estimating that in 
another state, Missouri, fees paid by investment companies alone were ten times blue sky 
expenses). 
127. See 1 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 102 n.216 (citing authority). 
128. UNIF. SEC. Acr § 303, 7B U.L.A. 515, 559 (1985). 
129. In 1985, a revised Uniform Securities Act was promulgated. See UNIF. SEC. Acr 
§ 303, 7B U.L.A. 515, 559 (1985). Section 303 of the revised Act also includes registration by 
coordination for securities registered under the Securities Act. 
The 1982 adoption by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Rule 415, permit-
ting the shelf registration of securities (that is, offer and sale at any time within two years 
after the effective date of the registration statement) inspired a new form of registration 
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Third, at least some states have performed a significant enforce-
ment role with respect to fraud in local securities offerings. But the 
results vary significantly from state to state. In many jurisdictions, 
parsimonious state budgets have meant understaffing of state secur-
ities law programs. In ten of the thirty jurisdictions covered by the 
1984 survey described earlier,130 only one blue sky employee was an 
attorney or certified public accountant, and Nevada boasted no pro-
fessionals in either category. Inevitably, the state programs have 
developed an erratic enforcement record. California - the largest 
reporting state, with over 160 employees - was responsible for 
sixty criminal convictions in 1984; twelve other states - including 
such major jurisdictions as Connecticut, Florida, Pennsylvania, and 
Virginia - reported either one or no criminal convictions that 
year.131 
by coordination (although it is often not called that). Currently over 30 jurisdictions 
have either a registration by coordination procedure or an exemption for securities reg-
istered with the SEC under Rule 415. 
1 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note l, at 103 n.219 and sources cited therein. In many jurisdic-
tions, when a security is filed for the shelf with the SEC, Form U-1, the Uniform Application 
to Register Securities, must be filed with the jurisdiction's securities administrator and will 
remain effective typically either for a period of one year with a right to renew or for two 
years. Registration at the local level generally becomes effective the moment the federal 
registration statement becomes effective. See Therese H. Maynard, Blue Sky Regulation of 
Rule 415 Shelf-Registered Primary Offerings: The Need for a Limited Form of Federal Pre-
emption, 22 ARiz. ST. L.J. 89, 112 n.124, 113 (1990). 
130. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text. 
131. The 1984 data obtained from NASAA were as follows: 
678 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 93:649 
Today, the most significant augmentative aspect of the state 
blue sky laws may well be in providing broader private relief in 
many instances than do the federal securities laws.132 
A residual tension between federal and state securities law has 
endured. While the mandatory disclosure system of the federal se-
curities laws purports only to require full and complete disclosure 
of material information, virtually all state jurisdictions specify stan-
dards for the denial, suspension, or revocation of securities registra-
tion.133 In approximately eighteen jurisdictions, traditional "merit" 
regulations remain in force.134 A significant additional number of 
Cease & Denials Crim. Consent 
State Desist Orders etc. Injunctions Con. Orders 
Ala. 94 15 0 8 29 
Cal. 67 95 9 60 N.A. 
Conn. 8 2 0 1 2 
Fla. 13 3 10 1 N.A. 
Ga. 130 0 3 5 0 
Idaho N.A. 5 62 3 2 
Ill. 38 8 1 2 N.A. 
Iowa 29 10 1 0 10 
Kan. 6 0 1 6 7 
Ky. 7 3 0 0 3 
Minn. 54 10 0 2 9 
Mont 45 4 3 2 4 
Neb. 12 10 0 5 0 
Nev. 4 0 0 0 0 
N.D. 18 3 1 0 0 
Ohio 34 3 2 3 2 
Okla. N.A. 103 39 4 1 
Or. 19 3 5 1 0 
Pa. N.A. 9 1 0 26 
S.D. 8 0 0 0 0 
Tenn. 8 16 0 8 20 
Tex. 29 4 35 18 N.A. 
Utah 0 12 0 0 1 
Va. N.A. N.A. 10 1 6 
Wash. 60 57 0 8 9 
Wyo. 6 1 0 0 0 
1 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 1, at 151. In this table, "Denials etc." represent Denials, 
Suspensions, and Revocations; "Crim. Con." means Criminal Convictions; and "N.A." means 
Not Ascertainable. 
132. See 9 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 1, at 4133-34 n.3; Marc I. Steinberg, The Emer-
gence of State Securities Laws: Partly Sunny Skies for Investors, 62 U. CIN. L. REv. 395, 395 
(1993). 
133. See 1 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 1, at 105-07. 
134. 'JYpical of these standards are those of Kansas and California. The Kansas Act of 
1957 authorizes a stop order on any one of eight grounds, including a finding that the issuer's 
"plan of business is unfair, inequitable, dishonest or fraudulent" or that "the securities of-
fered .•• in payment for property, patents, formulae, good will, promotion or intangible 
assets, are in excess of the reasonable value thereof, or the offering has been, or would be, 
made with unreasonable amounts of options." KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-1260(a)(l), (3) 
(1988). 
In California, the commissioner may refuse to issue a permit unless he finds, among other 
things, that "the proposed plan of business of the applicant and the proposed issuance of 
securities are fair, just, and equitable, [and] that the applicant intends to transact its business 
fairly and honestly." CAL CoRP. CooE § 25140(b) (West 1977). The law also provides, how-
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jurisdictions employ a modified form of merit regulation, adopting 
the language of Uniform Securities Act§ 306(a)(2)(F), which per-
mits "merit" regulation only when "the offering has been or would 
be made with unreasonable amounts of underwriters' and sellers' 
discounts, commissions, or other compensation, or promoters' prof-
its or participation, or unreasonable amounts or kinds of 
options."135 
[I]n recent years, the wisdom of merit standards has emerged as the 
leading policy debate concerning state securities regulation. As a 
practical matter, there are two different patterns of merit regulation 
today. First, there are generic rules aimed at regulating 'cheap stock,' 
[or] excessive warrants and options . . . . Second, separate guidelines 
regulate specific industries such as real estate[, or] oil and gas .... 136 
Proponents of merit regulation argue that by giving state securi-
ties administrators power to halt nonmeritorious issues, investors 
are better protected from fraud or overreaching than they would be 
under a pure disclosure form of regulation like the Securities Act of 
1933. Empirical studies by Conrad Good.kind, Deputy Commis-
sioner of Securities in Wisconsin, focusing on that state's merit stan-
dards between 1968 and 1971, 137 and Ernest Walker and Beverly 
ever, that when the commissioner takes the initiative to suspend or revoke a permit that has 
already been issued, or in the first instance when the issuer has used the "notification" or 
"coordination" procedure, as well as in all nonissuer offerings, the commissioner has the bur-
den of finding that the proposed plan of business or issuance "is not fair, just, or equitable." 
CAL. CoRP. CoDE § 25140~a) (West 1977) (emphasis added). Moreover, neither standard 
applies in the case of a cash offering pursuant to a firm commitment underwriting in which 
the issue is registered with the SEC under the 1933 Act and all the underwriters are regis-
tered with the SEC under the 1934 Act CAL. CoRP. CODE§ 25140(d) (West 1977). 
135. UNIF. SEC. Acr § 306(a)(2)(F), 7B U.L.A. 515, 575 (1985); see also 1 Loss & SEUG-
MAN, supra note 1, at 109 n.233 (citing sources). 
136. 1 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 110-15. "There is a fairly detailed literature 
concerning merit regulation." 1 id. at 110 n.236; see also 1 id. at 110-12 n.236 (citing sources). 
In 1986, the ABA's Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Merit Regulation of the State Regulation 
of Securities Committee published a Report on State Merit Regulation of Securities Offerings, 
41 Bus. LAW. 785 (1986). The Report was not intended to be a brief for or against merit 
regulation but was designed to "improve the quality of debate on this complex subject." Id. 
at 788. 
Among other recommendations, the Report urged (1) greater experimentation with blue 
sky "safe harbors" as an alternative to repeal of merit regulation, (2) more realistic 
NASAA guidelines, (3) greater SEC-NASAA cooperation[,] ( 4) a broader exemption 
for publicly traded securities, [such as] those listed in the NASDAQ National Market 
System List[,] (5) a transactional exemption for investment company offerings, and (6) 
reconsideration of the NASAA guideline on "cheap stock." 
1 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 112 n.236. 
137. See Conrad G. Goodkind, Blue Sky Law: Is There Merit in the Merit Requirements?, 
1976 WIS. L. REv. 79, 107-23. Goodkind attempted to study all 469 equity securities regis-
tered or denied for cause in Wisconsin between 1968 and 1971, with the exception of securi-
ties in noncash transactions such as mergers or exchange offers. Of these 469 securities, 121 
could not be studied because issuers declined to respond to information requests or the Pos-
tal Service was unable to deliver correspondence. During the 1968-1971 period, there were 
eight reasons for denial of registration: (i) insufficient promoters' equity investment; (ii) ex-
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Bailey Hadaway, respectively professors of management and fi-
nance, studying Texas issues between 1975 and 1980, suggest that 
securities approved after merit review tend to have superior subse-
quent price performance than securities denied for cause or with-
drawn from issuance in that state.13s 
Even if one assumes that the case for merit regulation can be 
persuasively articulated in a national context,139 this debate takes 
on a different character when state law merit standards are applied 
to domestic or foreign issuers that can sell securities abroad. If en-
forcement of merit standards tended to encourage the distribution 
cessive cheap stock; (iii) excessive options and warrants issued or reserved for issuance; (iv) 
excessive sales price in relation to market, price-earnings ratio, or other factors; (v) excessive 
underwriters' compensation and selling expenses; (vi) inequitable shareholders' voting rights; 
(vii) insufficiency of earnings to cover interest on debt securities or dividends on preferred 
stock proposed to be issued; and (viii) miscellaneous factors such as unfairness of insider 
transactions or unsound financial conditions of the issuer. Id. at 108-09. The principal results 
of the study are summarized in the following table: 
Aggregate Performance 
(percent change) 
Price Price Book Book Dividends 
1 Year 3 years 1 year 3 years for 3 years 
All Denied 14.49 (14.23) (14.68) 13.76 .84 
All Registered 8.38 14.00 8.9 32.83 3.23 
In this table, price and book value are expressed as a percentage change from offering price 
or proforma book value at offering. Dividends for three years are expressed as a percentage 
of offering price. In the "All Denied" category there were 137 issues measured for price and 
127 for book value and dividends; in the "All Registered" category there were 211 issues 
measured for price and 184 measured for book value and dividends. Id. at 111. Goodkind's 
study was criticized in James S. Mofsky & Robert D. Tollison, Demerit in Merit Regulation, 60 
MAR.a. L. REv. 367, 369-77 (1977) (emphasizing that the Goodkind study ignored costs of 
merit regulation), and in Hugh H. Makens, Who Speaks for the Investor? An Evaluation of 
the Assault on Merit Regulation, 13 U. BALT. L. REv. 435, 454-55 (1984) (criticizing 
Goodkind for focusing solely on corporate equity offerings). 
138. See Ernest W. Walker & Beverly Bailey Hadaway, Merit Standards Revisited: An 
Empirical Analysis of the Efficacy of Texas Merit Standards, 7 J. CoRP. L. 651, 668-69 (1982). 
Walker and Hadaway found that approved securities had a 56.60% return, as a percent of 
the offering price, over a three-year holding period. Withdrawn securities had a 26.06% re-
turn. Id. at 675; see also WISCONSIN OFF. OF CoMMR. OF SEc., MERIT REvmw: IN nm 
PUBLIC INTEREST? AN EMPIRICAL AND QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF MERIT REOULATION OP 
CoMMON STOCK OFFERINOS IN WISCONSIN 16 (1986-87) ("[T]he Committee has found that 
the perception that merit ri;view impedes economic growth is generally unfounded."). Com-
pare, for instance, the FEDERAL TRADE CoMMN., STAFF REPORT, MINIMUM QUALITY VER-
sus DISCLOSURE REGULATIONS: STATE REOULATION OF INTERSTATE OPENED-END 
INvEsrMENT CoMPANY AND CoMMON STOCK ISSUES (June 1987), which states, 
Strongly risk averse small investors may have benefitted [from the merit review of com-
mon stock issuers], absent consideration of the costs of regulation that were not studied 
here. Investors with diversified portfolios or small investors with less aversion to risk 
would have preferred to have access to the issues that the merit states evaluated and so 
were harmed by the regulations. 
Id. at 80-81. 
139. See 1 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 120-22 (discussing traditional criticisms of 
merit regulation); see also Brian J. Fahrney, Comment, State Blue Sky Laws: A Stronger Case 
for Federal Pre-Emption Due to Increasing Internationalization of Securities Markets, 86 Nw. 
u. L. REv. 753, 765-68 (1992). 
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of securities issuances solely abroad, this could not be rationalized 
as advantaging either U.S. issuers or investors. 
To some extent, most states have reduced the conflict between 
their merit standards and actual or potential international offerings 
by adopting a "marketplace exemption" from merit review for se-
curities listed on the New York and American stock exchanges.140 
Some states also exempt securities traded in the alternative over-
the-counter market in the computerized NASDAQ National Mar-
ket System list.141 
The practical problem, given an increasingly international econ-
omy, is more fully to perfect a system of state securities regulation 
that will not impede registration within the United States. Poten-
tially, this might mean a system of partial preemption by the Securi-
ties Act of 1933 for registered offerings. Under such a system, the 
states would be prohibited from imposing disclosure and other stan-
dards more demanding than those enforced under the Securities 
Act of 1933.142 In effect, merit regulation for issues registered 
under the federal Securities Act would be prohibited. 
Such partial preemption would have little or no impact on those 
states that today do not employ merit regulation or on those states 
where merit regulation is effectively reserved for offerings exempt 
from the 1933 Securities Act - for example, by dint of the market-
place exemption. Under this proposal, merit regulation would con-
tinue to exist in those states that wished to employ it for offerings 
exempt from the Securities Act of 1933. 
More significantly, all states could continue to require registra-
tion by coordination - that is, simultaneous with SEC registration 
- and could continue to play a role in securities law enforcement. 
But the filing requirements at the state level would essentially be 
limited to the filing of documents required by the Securities Act of 
1933 for registered offerings. 
Besides simplifying the often quite burdensome task of "blue 
skying" a securities issuance in up to fifty states as well as the Dis-
trict of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and Guam, partial preemption 
along these lines would end concerns of domestic and foreign issu-
ers about the possibility of being able to satisfy federal but not state 
140. See 1 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 1, at 121; Mark A. Sargent, A Future for Blue 
Sky Law, 62 U. CIN. L REv. 471, 474-75 (1993) (discussing the marketplace exemption). 
141. Criteria for exchange listing and trading in the NASDAQ Nationiµ Market System 
List are analyzed in 4 Loss & SEuGMAN, supra note 1, at 1733-2119; 5 id. at 2477-652; 6 id. at 
2653-830. The NASAA Committee approved a model NMS exemption in 1986. State Regis-
tration Exemptions, NASAA Rep. (CCH) 'l'I 4811, 4821 (Mar. 14, 1986). 
142. Such a proposal was made earlier in Fahrney, supra note 139, at 776-81. 
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registration requirements, or the possibility that state registration 
requirements might significantly delay or add to the costs of an 
issuance.143 
Inevitably, the application of merit standards to issuers capable 
of selling securities abroad has and will continue to shrink.144 This 
is not a consequence of an academic or purely domestic debate 
about the wisdom of merit standards. It is, instead, a consequence 
of the increasingly international context of securities sales. The 
emergence of a global securities market ultimately should result in 
the United States' federal level becoming the sole level of concern 
for issuers capable of selling abroad. A concurrent system that op-
erated well enough when securities sales were generally domestic 
runs the risk of becoming self-defeating when securities issuers 
have the option of selling in foreign securities markets. 
B. The Securities Act of 1933 
If the tendency in the boundary between federal and state secur-
ities laws is generally in favor of a further diminution of the state 
role, matters are notably different with respect to the scope of the 
Securities Act of 1933. This Act requires issuers to file a registra-
tion statement when distributing securities to the public.145 During 
the past decades, the frequency with which corporate issuers have 
had to provide a detailed description of their firms and their busi-
nesses in a registration statement has significantly declined, primar-
ily as a result of the greater use of truncated, transaction-oriented 
disclosure requirements and the use of the private placement ex-
emption. The significance of the mandatory disclosure system 
under the 1933 Act, in effect, has shrunk as a consequence of the 
combined effect of the efficient market hypothesis, which suggested 
that disclosure under the 1933 Act is unnecessary if the same disclo-
sure is made to the market under the periodic requirements of the 
Securities Exchange Act; the rise of foreign capital markets, which 
created a practical alternative to the domestic sale of securities; and 
143. See Sargent, supra note 140, at 490 ("Former SEC Chairman Richard Breeden sug-
gested that the states should be out of the international regulatory game, except perhaps for 
purposes of enforcement."). This article further quotes Breeden: "It is frustrating that as of 
1991 Great Britain will allow the use of a prospectus filed in Berlin, but it will not be legal to 
use automatically a prospectus filed with the SEC in California." Id. (quoting Breeden Re· 
peats Call for Permitting U.S. Firms to Invest in Domestic Banks, 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 
(BNA) 351 (Mar. 9, 1990)). See generally Sargent, supra note 140, at 489-92. 
144. Cf. Sargent, supra note 140, at 482-85 (explaining why merit regulation is becoming 
irrelevant). 
145. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1988). 
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the increased demand for securities by institutions, which effec-
tively broadened the private placement market. 
The practical consequence of these forces can be overstated.146 
If a corporation provides the same material information to inves-
tors in an annual report that it previously provided in a registration 
statement, the effect is formal rather than substantive. 
There is, however, a larger point that has generally been missed 
by those who view the mandatory disclosure system as withering. 
While the internationalization of the securities markets may poten-
tially lead to diminution of what must be disclosed, in the recent 
past this impact has been dwarfed by a significant expansion of 
what must be disclosed by all seasoned firms in their annual reports 
to the SEC. 
Let me place this larger point in context. The SEC's "integrated 
disclosure system" has two major aspects. First, it coordinates re-
quired disclosures under the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act, in light of 
an assumption of the efficient market hypothesis that information 
effectively disseminated to the public will be rapidly reflected in 
share prices regardless of the source of the data.141 This aspect of 
the system is responsible for streamlined registration forms, notably 
Forms S-2 and S-3 for registrants subject to the 1934 Act's continu-
ous disclosure obligations. Second, the system also developed ge-
neric disclosure items for both 1933 Act registration and 1934 Act 
registration and continuous reporting by adding a new Regulation 
S-K (nonfinancial items) to the existing Regulation S-X (financial 
items).148 Previously, required disclosures under the two Acts had 
been developed independently of each other. 
The first detailed articulation of the integrated disclosure system 
concept was a highly influential 1966 law review article by Milton 
146. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
147. The efficient market hypothesis is discussed supra at notes 91-92 and accompanying 
text. The applicability of this hypothesis to an integrated disclosure system was considered in 
several releases. See, e.g., Proposed Comprehensive Revision to System for Registration of 
Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 33-6235, 20 SEC Docket 1175, 1177-99 
(Sept. 2, 1980); Reproposal of Comprehensive Revision to System for Registration of Securi-
ties Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 33-6331, 23 SEC Docket 288, 290-91 (Aug. 18, 
1981); Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act Release No. 33-6383, 24 
SEC Docket (CCH) 1262, 1267 (Mar. 26, 1982); see also Milton H. Cohen, The Integrated 
Disclosure System- Unfinished Business, 40 Bus. LAw. 987, 992-95 (1985) (expressing con-
cern that the quality of registration statements has been lowered); Jeffrey N. Gordon & 
Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 761, 810-18 (1985); Lynn Nicholas, The Integrated Disclosure System and Its 
Impact Upon Underwriters' Due Diligence: Will Investors Be Protected?, 11 SEC. REo. LJ. 3 
(1983). 
148. Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210 (1994); Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229 (1994); 
Form S-2, 17 C.F.R. § 230.12 (1994); Form S-3, 17 C.F.R. § 230.13 (1994). 
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H. Cohen, the Special Study's director, entitled "Truth in Securities" 
Revisited.149 Cohen's article begins with the following thesis: 
[T]he combined disclosure requirements of these statutes would have 
been quite different if the 1933 and 1934 Acts (the latter as extended 
in 1964) had been enacted in opposite order, or had been enacted as a 
single, integrated statute - that is, if the starting point had been a 
statutory scheme of continuous disclosures covering issuers of actively 
traded securities and the question of special disclosures in connection 
with public offerings had then been faced in this setting. Accordingly, 
it is my plea that there now be created a new coordinated disclosure 
system having as its basis the continuous disclosure system of the 1934 
Act and treating "1933 Act" disclosure needs on this foundation.150 
To achieve this coordinated - or integrated - disclosure sys-
tem, Cohen urged that the disclosure process under the 1934 Act, 
which '.'appears never to have been taken quite as seriously as 
under the 1933 Act,"151 should "operate so that the public files con-
tain, at any given time, information substantially equivalent to a 
current 1933 Act prospectus ... with regard to any security in which 
there is active investor interest. "152 He proposed several measures 
to bring the quality of 1934 Act disclosures closer to the level of 
1933 Act filings: (i) the pertinent civil liability provisions in the two 
Acts should be harmonized rather than retaining a considerably 
milder standard under the 1934 Act; (ii) SEC review of 1934 Act 
filings should resemble "in thoroughness and promptness" its re-
view of 1933 Act filings; and (iii) there should be a uniform system 
for numbering items in the basic registration and report forms.153 
Further, Cohen urged that once the continuous disclosure system of 
the 1934 Act has been improved "to the limits of practicability," 
"continuous registrants" that are fully subject to the reporting, 
proxy soliciting, and insider trading provision of sections 13, 14, and 
16 of the 1934 Act should be subject to "greatly relaxed" special 
disclosure requirements under the 1933 Act, so that a public offer-
ing filing does not merely duplicate what already exists in the public 
file.154 In contrast, Cohen also argued that a first-time registrant 
should, as in the past, make a comprehensive 1933 Act filing.155 
149. See Milton H. Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARV. L. RE.v. 1340 (1966). 
150. Id. at 1341-42. 
151. Id. at 1361. 
152. Id. at 1368. 
153. Id. at 1368-75. 
154. Id. at 1379, 1406-07. 
155. Id. at 1407-08. 
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While Cohen's logical argument was cogent, quite different fac-
tors ultimately led to the integration of the mandatory disclosure 
system. First, it was generally recognized that the mechanisms of an 
efficient market, in fact, appear to operate, at least with respect to 
the most actively traded securities. In 1969, the SEC's Disclosure 
Policy Study concurred with Cohen's proposal for a coordinated 
disclosure system. In Disclosure to Investors: A Reappraisal of Ad-
ministrative Policies under the '33 and '34 Securities Acts, 1s6 the SEC 
argued that information in SEC filings would be rapidly dissemi-
nated because of intermediaries in the investment process - such 
as professional money managers, brokerage firm research staffs, 
and investment advisers, who would study these filings and "filter" 
out key new information to a wider public - and also because of 
advances in the technology of data dissemination.157 Subsequently, 
the SEC's 1977 Advisory Committee Report carried these points 
further, asserting that "competition among analysts results in secur-
ity prices that reflect a broad set of information."158 This competi-
tion, in part, is dependent on "a uniquely active and responsive 
:financial press which facilitates the broad dissemination of highly 
timely and material company-oriented information to a vast reader-
ship. "159 In effect, these SEC studies described mechanisms by 
which an efficient market could operate. Subsequently, particularly 
in its consideration of the eligibility requirements for the truncated 
Form S-3, the SEC conservatively defined the class of companies 
that it was confidenfwere subject to "efficient" information dissem-
ination and analysis. 
156. SEC, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS: A REAPPRAISAL OF ADMINISTRATIVE Poucms 
UNDER THE '33 AND '34 SECURITIES Acrs (1969). 
157. Id. at 10, 48, 52-54 (noting that membership in the Financial Analysts Federation had 
grown from 2422 members in 1950 to 11,752 by the end of 1967); id. at 63-64, 313-23 (noting 
that the new technology at that time was microfiche). 
158. REPORT OF THE ADVISORY CoMM. ON CoRP. DISCLOSURE TO THE.SEC, HOUSE 
CoMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN CoMMERCE, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 620-21 (Comm. Print 
1977) (footnote omitted). See generally id. at 618-52. By 1977 there were over 14,000 mem-
bers in the Financial Analysts Federation. Id. at 620. As Professors Ronald Gilson and 
Reinier Kraakman later wrote: 
In today's securities markets, the dominant minority of informed traders is the com-
munity of market professionals, such as arbitragers, researchers, brokers and portfolio 
managers, who devote their careers to acquiring information and honing evaluative 
skills. The trading volume in most securities that these professionals control, directly or 
indirectly, seems sufficient to assure the market's rapid assimilation into price of most 
routine information. 
Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 10 VA. L. 
REv. 549, 571 (1984) (footnotes omitted). 
159. Proposed Comprehensive Revision to System for Registration of Securities Offer-
ings, Securities Act Release No. 33-6235, 20 SEC Docket 1175, 1179 (Sept. 2, 1980). This 
Release relied on the findings of the Report of the Advisory Committee on Corporate Dis-
closure to the SEC, Nov. 3, 1977. See id. at 1179 n.12. 
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At approximately the same time, a quite different factor 
strengthened the momentum for truncating the disclosure require-
ments under the Securities Act. For several decades the SEC had 
generally interpreted section 6(a) of that Act to permit registration 
of only those securities that would be sold soon after the registra-
tion statement was declared effective.160 As a practical matter, this 
view prevented "shelf registration," by which an issuer would regis-
ter and leave the securities "on the shelf" until market conditions 
warranted a "takedown," or sale of the securities.161 
"A combination of regulatory and marketplace changes inspired 
the Commission to reexamine the shelf registration issue early in 
the 1980s . . . . [Most significantly], the growth of a competitive 
Eurobond market placed SEC regulation of new issues in a new 
international context. "162 Unless SEC administration of the Securi-
ties Act permitted issuers to sell securities as rapidly in the United 
States as in Europe, it was reasonable to assume that a considerable 
portion of both American and foreign issues would exclusively be 
sold abroad. In 1980, the SEC attempted to enable U.S. investors 
to participate more effectively in the international bond market by 
publishing a staff interpretation - known at the SEC as the "King-
dom of Sweden" Release - indicating that foreign governments 
and their political subdivisions would be permitted to sell debt is-
sues "off the shelf" in the United States if they undertook to file 
posteffective .amendments with the SEC.163 
160. The last sentence of§ 6(a) provides: "A registration statement shall be deemed ef-
fective only as to the securities specified therein as proposed to be offered." Securities Act 
§ 6(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77f(a) (1988). For the legislative history of this section, see H.R. REP. No. 
85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 7, 18-20 (1933), and H.R. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 25 
(1933). See also Scott Hodes, Shelf Registration: The Dilemma of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, 49 VA. L. REv. 1106 (1963) (urging that a strict interpretation of§ 6(a) 
prohibits all shelf registrations). 
In administrative opinions early in its history, the SEC interpreted this sentence to mean 
"that Congress contemplated that registration should be effective only in connection with 
offerings proposed to be made in the proximate future." Shawnee Chiles Syndicate, 10 SEC 
109, 113 (1941) (footnote omitted). One of the draftsmen, Benjamin V. Cohen, is said to 
have confinned that this was the intention. See Hodes, supra, at 1110 n.17. 
161. There were limited exceptions to the long-standing prohibition on shelf registration. 
See 1 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 355-56. 
162. 1 id. at 357-58. 
163. Eurobonds, in essence, are bonds issued abroad - in Europe and elsewhere -
effectively outside any national regulatory system. See Interpretative Release Relating to 
Delayed Offerings by Foreign Governments or Political Subdivisions Thereof, Securities Act 
Release No. 33-6240, 20 SEC Docket 1358 (Sept 10, 1980); see also OFFICE OF CHIEF ECON· 
OMIST, SEC, EURODOLLAR BONDS: ALTERNATIVE FINANCING FOR UNITED STATES COMPA-
NIES 10 (1985) (arguing that the most important reason for the growth of the market "is that 
U.S. firms believe that they can borrow at lower interest costs overseas than in the United 
States"); REPORT ON INTERNATIONALIZATION, supra note 63, at 11-8 to 11-10, 111-4 to III-58; 
Interpretive Release Relating to Continuous and Delayed Offerings by Foreign Govern-
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Cumulatively, the general recognition of the mechanisms of an 
efficient market for information dissemination and the potential for 
significant export of U.S. securities sales persuaded the SEC in 1982 
to adopt both the current integrated disclosure system and shelf re-
gistration Rule 415.164 
The integrated disclosure system permits specified seasoned is-
suers using a truncated Form S-3165 to file a brief registration state-
ment primarily describing the securities issuance and recent 
material changes166 and then to incorporate by reference the fol-
lowing: (i) its latest Form 10-K annual report, (ii) subsequent quar-
terly and monthly 1934 Act reports, and (iii) if capital stock is to be 
registered and the same class is registered under section 12 of the 
ments or Political Subdivisions Thereof, Securities Act Release No. 33-6424, 26 SEC Docket 
(CCH) 20 (Sept. 2, 1982). 
The significance of the Euro bond market to the development of Rule 415 is widely recog-
nized. See, e.g., Beth McGoldrick, Life with Rule 415, INSTITUTIONAL INvEsToR, Feb. 1983, 
at 129, 130; Steve Lohr, Rolling in Money in London, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1986, § 3, at 1. 
164. See Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act Release No. 33-6383, 
24 SEC Docket (CCH) 1318 (Mar. 3, 1982); see also 17 C.F.R. § 229 (1994) (Regulation S-K 
disclosures); 47 Fed. Reg. 39,803, amending 47 Fed. Reg. 11, 401 (1982) (codified at 17 C.F.R. 
§ 229.512(a) (1994)) (adoption of Item 512(a) undertakings); 47 Fed. Reg. 11,380, 11,394 
(1982) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.415(a)(3) (1994)) (adoption ofRule 415 regarding delayed 
or continuous offering and sale of securities): 
165. Initially the Commission adopted two general types of eligibility requirements for 
Form S-3: 
First, there [were] registrant requirements. American companies (and under certain cir-
cumstances foreign private issuers) [were required to] have reported under the 1934 Act 
for the past 36 calendar months, with a default-free record since the end of the last fiscal 
year on dividend and sinking fund installments on preferred stock, debt installments, or 
long-term lease rentals if the defaults in the aggregate were material to the financial 
position of the registrant. Second, there [were] transaction requirements. A company 
satisfying the registrant requirements could [then] use Form S-3: (1) for primary cash 
offerings if it had the requisite $150 million float [-that is, stock ownership by outside 
shareholders rather than the inside central group -] or a $100 million float and annual 
trading volume of at least 3 million shares; (2) for primary cash offerings of "investment 
grade" nonconvertible debt or nonconvertible preferred stock; (3) for secondary offer-
ings offered by any person other than the issuer (including underwriters) if securities of 
the same class were listed on a national securities exchange or quoted in NASDAQ; or 
(4) for certain rights offerings, dividend or interest reinvestment plans or conversions or 
warrants. 
2 Loss & SEUOMAN, supra note 1, at 615-16. For background on the Release, see 2 id. at 
608-12. 
In 1992, the SEC adopted revisions to Form S-3 that (i) shortened from 36 to 12 months 
the minimum issuer reporting requirements for all offerings of non-asset-backed securities; 
(ii) reduced the minimum public float requirement for issuers with at least $75 million in 
voting stock held by nonaffiliates; and (iii) added offerings of investment grade asset-backed 
securities qualified to be registered for automatic effectiveness upon filing of a Form S-3 
relating solely to a dividend or interest reinvestment plan. Simplification of Registration 
Procedures for Primary Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 33-6943, 51 SEC 
Docket (CCH) 1501 (July 16, 1992) (proposal); Securities Act Release No. 33-6964, 52 SEC 
Docket (CCH) 2015 (Oct. 22, 1992) (adoption). 
166. Specifically, a registrant filing on Form S-3 must include Items 202, 501-12, 601, and 
702 of Regulation S-K and information on material changes. Each of these items and the 
concept of material changes are described in 2 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 663-64. 
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1934 Act, a description of the class of securities that is contained in 
a registration statement filed under the 1934 Act, including amend-
ments or reports filed to update the description.161 
Rule 415, the new shelf registration rule, permits specified sea-
soned issuers eligible to file on Form S-3 to register for the shelf for 
up to two years.168 A variety of economic benefits have been at-
tributed to the rule. Studies suggest that the opportunity Rule 415 
provides to time the issuance of offerings to take advantage of mar-
ket conditions permits lower issuer costs.169 Underwriter competi-
tion to distribute primary offerings has similarly led to lower 
underwriting spreads.170 The issuer's cost of compliance with the 
Securities Act's registration procedure has also been reduced.111 
167. Each of the reports is incorporated by reference and is analyzed in 4 id. at 1854-84. 
168. Rule 415(a)(l)(x), 17 C.F.R. § 230.415(a)(l)(x) (1994). 
Both before and after the final adoption of Rule 415, a considerable proportion of securi-
ties registered with the SEC have been registered "for the shelf." In the adoption Release, 
the SEC summarized experience with Temporary Rule 415 in the following terms: "From 
March 1982 through September 1983, almost 4,600 shelf registration statements relating to 
$181 billion were filed. These shelf filings represent 52 % of the over 8,800 registration state-
ments and 52% of $345 billion of securities registered during this period." Shelf Registra-
tion, Securities Act Release No. 33-6499, 29 SEC Docket (CCH) 169, 171-77 (Nov. 17, 1983). 
169. See 29 SEC Docket (CCH) at 170 (summarizing several studies); OmCB OF CHmF 
ECONOMIST, SEC, UPDATE - RuLE 415 AND EoUITY MARKErs 21 (Dec. 1984) [hereinafter 
OmCB OF CHmF ECONOMISTS (Dec. 1984)] (estimating that shelf-registered equity offerings 
have lower issuing costs of about 0.630 cents per dollar raised for syndicated offerings and 
about 1.363 cents per dollar of equity raised for nonsyndicated offerings); OmCB OF CmEF 
ECONOMIST, SEC, EXPLAINING THE SAVINGS FROM RULE 415: THE DEBT MARKET 15 (Sept. 
17, 1984) (noting that industrial bond issues sold by shelf registration sell for about 20 basis 
points less, holding all other important factors constant, than similar negotiated issues); 
Barbara Ann Banoff, Regulatory Subsidies, Efficient Markets, and Shelf Registration: An 
Analysis of Rule 415, 70 VA. L. REv. 135, 149-53 (1984) (presenting a survey of several stud-
ies); David S. Kidwell et al., SEC Rule 415: The Ultimate Competitive Bid, 19 J. FIN. & 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 183, 194 (1984) (finding "that debt issues sold under Rule 415 sell 
between 30 and 40 basis points less than comparable negotiated sales").David S. Kidwell et 
al., Shelf Registration: Competition and Market Flexibility, 30 J.L. & EcoN. 181 (1987) (find-
ing that industrial bond issues sold by shelf registration sell for 20 basis points less than 
similar nonshelf sales). 
170. See OmCB OF CHmF EcoNOMIST (Dec. 1984) supra note 169, at 5-6; Memorandum 
from the Office of the Chief Economist to the Securities and Exchange Commission, Spil-
lover Effects of Shelf Registration: Underwriting Spreads on Negotiated Industrial Debt and 
Equity Issues (Dec. 5, 1984) (on file with the-Office of the Chief Economist) (using a sample 
of industrial debt and common stock issues sold between January 1977 and June 1983, and 
concluding that shelf registration had increased competition in the investment banking indus-
try and therefore had resulted in lower underwritten spreads in both shelf and negotiated 
issues); McGoldrick, supra note 163, at 130-31 (examining new risks for underwriters created 
by Rule 415); see also supra note 169 and sources cited therein. 
171. See Shelf Registration, Securities Act Release No. 33-6499, 29 SEC Docket (CCH) 
169, 171(Nov.17,1983) ("Legal, accounting, printing and other costs are stated to have been 
reduced, because only a single registration statement need be filed for a series of offerings, 
rather than a separate registration statement each time an offering is made.") 
In all, the SEC "conservatively" estimated total issuer savings of $280 million in 1983. 
Memorandum to George Kundahl, [SEC] Executive Director, from David Malmquist, Re: 
Estimates of Savings to Issuers Resulting from Rule 415 (May 17, 1984), reprinted in SEC 
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At the same time, there is also little question that Rule 415 
sharply reduced the ability of the managing underwriter to conduct 
a due diligence review.172 The registration statement normally is 
prepared solely by the issuer in a Rule 415 filing, rather than in 
conjunction with an underwriter. This reduces the ability of the un-
derwriter to provide an effective review of the registration state-
ment. Whether the issuer's cost savings justify this loss in due 
diligence is debatable. But, to keep this debate in context, it should 
Oversight and Technical Amendments: Hearing Before the Subcomm on Telecommunica-
tions, Consumer Protection, and Fm. of House Comm on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 
2d Sess. 322-24 (1984); see also Banoff, supra note 169, at 145-46; A.F. Ehrbar, Upheaval in 
Investment Banking, FORTUNE, Aug. 23, 1982, at 90, 92. 
172. The SEC has recognized that an underwriter's reasonable investigation will vary de-
pending on such "relevant circumstances" as "the type of underwriting arrangement ... and 
the availability of information with respect to the registrant." Rule 176(g), 17 C.F.R. 
§ 230.176(g) (1994). 
The effect of Rule 415 on underwriter due diligence was a major point emphasized in 
Commissioner Thomas's dissent to the SEC's September, 1982 extension of temporary Rule 
415. See Delayed or Continuous Offering and Sale of Securities, Securities Act Release No. 
33-6423, 26 SEC Docket (CCH) 2, 15-16 (Sept. 2, 1982). 
In adopting the final version of Rule 415, the SEC responded by noting that some issuers 
had developed continuous due diligence programs or periodic due diligence meetings. 
Others, emulating practice under the former Rule 50 of the Public Utility Holding Company 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1988), had begun appointing a law firm to act as underwriters' counsel 
before the underwriter was selected. See Shelf Regulation, 29 SEC Docket (CCH) at 172. 
While concurring in the majority's decision, Chairman Shad was plainly dubious that these 
and other procedures would fully compensate for the qualitative loss in underwriter due dili-
gence. See 29 SEC Docket (CCH) at 176. 
The former Director of the Special Study of the Securities Markets, Milton H. Cohen, in a 
thoughtful address, suggested that a new statutory treatment of § 18 of the Securities Ex-
change Act should be adopted to bring that Section closer to § 11 of the Securities Act as one 
means to develop appropriate liability standards in an integrated disclosure system. Com-
pare Exchange Act § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1988) with Securities Act § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 78c 
(1988). Cohen then added: 
With regard to the due diligence obligation of underwriters, and perhaps others, in 
connection with a public offering, we must then make a policy choice. Either we must 
conform the obligation to the practical needs of a marketing system in which competi-
tion, speed, and economy are dominant objectives, or else we must insist that those 
objectives not be pursued to the point that due diligence is impaired. But I would em-
phasize particularly that this policy choice will be much easier and less painful if the first 
two steps have been taken, that is, if continuous disclosure files have been brought to the 
highest practicable levels of quality and currency through appropriate statutory and reg-
ulatory changes. On that assumption, there should be little if any impairment of investor 
protection if the section 11 due diligence obligation at the time of a public offering were 
moderated; or, going the other way, the burdens and risks to underwriters would be 
brought within more tolerable limits even if the theoretical obligation were not 
moderated. 
Cohen, supra note 147, at 994; cf. Dana B. Klinges, Note, Expanding the Liability of Manag-
ing Underwriters Under the Securities Act of 1933, 53 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1063 (1985). 
Harvard Business School professors Auerbach and Hayes alternatively proposed that 
Rule 415 or§ 11 or both be amended so that (i) leading issuers would be made solely respon-
sible for Rule 415 issues; (ii) for the least qualified issuers, Rule 415 would remain unmodi-
fied; and (iii) for an in-between group, underwriters would be permitted to avoid liability if a 
reasonable investigation had been made by professional experts or agencies. JosEPH 
AUERBACH & SAMUELL. HAYES, Ill, INVESTMENT BANKING AND DIUGENCE: WHAT PRICE 
DEREGULATION? 189-98 (1986). 
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be borne in mind that the type of distribution involved in a non-
traditional Rule 415 issue typically will be a debt offering filed on 
Form S-3. Both because of the usually reduced investor risk in debt 
offerings and because of the integrated disclosure system, this 
would appear to be the type of distribution for which some sacrifice 
in due diligence could most readily be accommodated. 
During the same period, when Form S-3 and Rule 415 were be-
ing adopted, a third significant change in the scope of the registra-
tion requirements of the 1933 Act also occurred. It had always 
been an underlying premise of the Securities Act that "private 
placements" of securities to institutional investors or a limited 
number of sophisticated investors would not have to be regis-
tered.173 During the last few decades, the proportion of new corpo-
rate financing conducted through private placement, rather than 
public sale, has increased substantially. In 1970, for example, ap-
proximately 17% of all corporate securities sales were private. Be-
tween 1984 and 1987, the figure ranged from 30% to 39%.114 The 
vast preponderance of private placements involve the sale of debt 
to institutional investors.175 To facilitate the institutional market in 
the resale of privately placed securities, the SEC in 1990 adopted 
173. See supra note 55. This exemption now appears in § 4(2) of the Act. See Securities 
Act§ 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(4) (1988). For discussion of the private placement exemption, see 
generally 3 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 1350-1450. 
174. A 1988 SEC release included the following table: 
New Corporate Public and Private Financing 
(Millions of Dollars) 
Percent Percent Total New 
Public Public Private Private Financing 
1970 31,130 83 6;373 17 37,503 
1975 46,828 78 13,515 22 60;343 
1980 57 ;330 78 15,700 22 73,030 
1981 56,085 75 18,400 25 74,485 
1982 62,566 72 24;300 28 86,866 
1983 97,103 73 35,600 27 133,703 
1984 82,199 61 53,258 39 135,457 
1985 138,288 65 73,093 35 211;380 
1986 286,040 70 123,457 30 409,497 
1987 271,477 66 139;355 34 410,832 
Resale of Restricted Securities; Changes to Method of Detennining Holding Periods of Re-
stricted Securities Rules 144 and 145, Securities Act Release No. 33-6806, 42 SEC Docket 
(CCH) 76, 78 (Oct. 25, 1988). 
175. 4i SEC Docket (CCH) at 77-84. Another table in the same release reported the 
following: 
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Rule 144A,176 which permits qualified institutional buyers to 
purchase specified privately placed securities without registration 
under the Securities Act.111 
The combination of Form S-3, Rule 415, and the increased pro-
portion of institutional private placements has substantially reduced 
the scope of the Securities Act of 1933. This, in effect, represents 
the most significant erosion of the federal securities laws' 
mandatory disclosure system since the New Deal period. 
The integrated disclosure system - and implicitly the shelf re-
gistration and private placement concepts - are grounded in what 
the SEC terms "the principle of equivalency": 
Integration, as a concept, involves a conclusion as to equivalency be-
t.ween transactional (Securities Act) and periodic (Exchange Act) re-
porting. If a subject matter is material information (other than a 
description of the transaction itself), then it will be material both in 
the distribution of securities and to the trading markets. 
Moreover, requirements governing the description of such subject 
matters should be the same [for] both purposes .... 
. . . [T]he concept of integration also proceeds from the observa-
tion that information is regularly being furnished to the market 
through periodic reports under the Exchange Act. This information is 
evaluated by professional analysts and other sophisticated users, is 
available to the financial press and is obtainable by any other person 
who seeks it for free or at nominal cost. To the extent that the market 
accordingly acts efficiently, and this information is adequately re-
flected in the price of a registrant's outstanding securities, there seems 
little need to reiterate this information in a prospectus in the context 
of a distribution.178 
Amount of Private Placements by 'fype of Security 
(Millions of Dollars) 
Percent Percent 
Debt Debt Equity Equity Total 
1965 9,562 97 ~ -3- 9,820 
1975 12,852 95 663 5 13,515 
1980 13,800 88 1,900 12 15,700 
1981 16,000 87 2,400 13 18,400 
1982 20,700 85 3,600 15 24,300 
1983 28,800 81 6,800 19 35,600 
1984 43,600 82 9,700 18 53,300 
1985 60,565 83 12,528 17 73,093 
1986 110,524 90 12,933 10 123,457 
1987 122,124 88 17,231 12 139,355 
42 SEC Docket (CCH) at 79. See generally Symposium, Exemptions for Institutional Inves-
tors or Concepts of Non-Public Offerings: A Comparative Study, 13 U. PA. J. INTL. Bus. L. 
473 (1993). 
176. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A {1994). 
177. Securities Act Release No. 33-6862, 46 SEC Docket (CCH) 26 (Apr. 23, 1990); see 
Loss & SEuGMAN, supra note 1, at 384-404 (1994 Ann. Supp.). 
178. Proposed Comprehensive Revision to System for Registration of Securities Offer-
ings, Securities Act Release No. 33-6235, 20 SEC Docket 1175, 1177 (Sept. 2, 1980). 
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The difficulty with the principle of equivalency is that the regis-
trant's preparation of information under the 1933 and 1934 Acts is 
not equivalent. This remains true in the sense recognized by Milton 
H. Cohen that the pertinent civil liability provisions in the 1933 and 
1934 Acts are different, with milder standards operative under the 
1934 Act.179 Although every underwriter who participates in a se-
curities offering may be held liable under section 11 of the 1933 
Act, there is no statutory provision ensuring that underwriters will 
perform a comparable role by way of monitoring the quality of 1934 
Act reports.180 This means, in effect, that in a substantial propor-
tion of securities sales, underwriters will not be responsible for con-
ducting a due diligence investigation.181 
While this represents a real loss in terms of investor protec-
tion, 182 both the significance of the reduced effective scope of the 
1933 Act and the reduced role of underwriters in performing due 
diligence on registered offerings has been dwarfed by a counter-
vailing development. 
The past two decades have witnessed a significant expansion in 
what must be disclosed by all registrants in their 1934 Act Form 10-
K annual reports and by new issuers when they register securities 
under the 1933 Act. This expansion, in effect, represents a "soft 
information revolution" in the mandatory disclosure system. 
Before 1972, the SEC generally only permitted registrants to file 
historical or "hard" information and generally prohibited projec-
tions of future or "soft" information. There were three somewhat 
179. See Cohen, supra note 147, at 992-95; supra text accompanying note 153; see also 
David M Green, Comment, Due Diligence under Rule 415: Is the insurance Worth the Pre-
mium?, 38 EMORY L.J. 793 (1989); cf. Herb Frerichs, Jr., Underwriter Due Diligence Within 
the Integrated Disclosure System - If It Isn't Broken, Don't Fix lt, 16 SEC. REo. L.J. 386 
(1989). 
180. To be sure, underwriters, in some circumstances, can be held liable for documents 
incorporated by reference into a registration statement. But the SEC has adopted Rule 
176(h), 17 C.F.R. § 230.176(h) (1994), which as a practical matter may obviate the liability of 
an underwriter when it had no responsibility for the preparation of a document incorporated 
by reference. 
181. Under § 11 of the Securities Act. underwriters can be held liable for material mis-
representations or omissions in a registration statement unless they carry the burden of prov-
ing that they conducted a reasonable investigation and had reasonable grounds to believe 
and did believe that the registration statement was true when it became effective. See Securi-
ties Act § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77(k) (1988). See generally 9 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 
4246-78. 
182. On the other hand, there are substantial advantages of the integrated disclosure sys-
tem in terms of reduction of issuer document preparation costs, swifter SEC review of fonns 
such as Form S-3, better registrant control over when to go to the capital markets, and im-
proved quality of 1934 Act reports. Whether these advantages outweigh the likely deteriora-
tion in the preparation of some 1933 Act registration statements endures as a pivotal policy 
question concerning the integrated disclosure system. 
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overlapping bases for this exclusionary policy. Frrst, the relevant 
constituency for SEC documents was assumed to be the unsophisti-
cated investor. An Advisory Committee Report on disclosure ex-
plained: "The disclosure objective of providing meaningful 
information to the investment community has, in cases of perceived 
conflict, been subordinated to the objective of protecting unsophis-
ticated investors from their own ignorance."183 Thus, the exclusion 
of projections was justified as necessary to prevent them from being 
given undue credence by investors or being manipulated by manag-
ers. Second, projections were then viewed not as "facts" but as in-
herently unreliable. Third, paradoxically, investors were 
characterized as being just as competent as managers to make pro-
jections. The last two points were memorably articulated by Harry 
Heller, a senior SEC attorney, in a 1961 law review article: 
As early as 1904 Veblen expressed the view that the value of an in-
vestment basically is a function of future earning power .... 
The question will be raised, if the determination of future earnings 
is the prime task confronting the investor, why not require or permit a 
direct prediction of such earnings? The answer to this is that the Se-
curities Act, like the hero of "Dragnet" is interested exclusively in 
facts. Conjectures and speculations as to the future are left by the Act 
to the investor on the theory that he is as competent as anyone to 
predict the future from the given facts. Since an expert can speak 
with authority only as to subjects upon which he has professional 
knowledge and since no engineering course or other professional 
training has ever been known to qualify anyone as a clairvoyant, at-
tempts by companies to predict future earnings on their own or on the 
authority of experts have almost invariably been held by the Commis-
sion to be misleading because they suggest to the investor a compe-
tence and authority which in fact does not exist.184 
On these bases, the SEC, in essence, took the view that projections 
were per se misleading and so stated in a note to one of its proxy 
rules.185 
By the early 1970s, the SEC's exclusionary policy was under se-
vere criticism. One influential critic was Professor Homer Kripke. 
In a 1970 law review article, he dismissed the SEC's policy as "non-
183. REPORT OF nm ADVISORY CoMM. ON CoRP. DISCLOSURE TO nm SEC, HOUSE 
CoMM. ON INTERsrATE AND FOREIGN CoMMERCE, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 348 (Comm. Print 
1977). See generally id. at 344-79, A-265 to A-329. 
184. Harry Heller, Disclosure Requirements under Federal Securities Regulation, 16 Bus. 
LAw. 300, 304, 307 (1961) (footnotes omitted). _ 
185. Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 note (1994) (proscribing predictions of specific 
future market values, earnings, or dividends); see also Union Pac. R.R. v. Chicago & N.W. 
Ry., 226 F. Supp. 400, 408-10 (N.D. Ill. 1964). The Note was later withdrawn. See Securities 
Act Release No. 33-5699, 9 SEC Docket 472 (Apr. 23, 1976). 
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sense."186 Noting that "most sizeable corporations use projections 
of future sales and revenues and capital needs as the basis for mak-
ing very important decisions as to borrowing, building new plants, 
establishing new branches, ordering materials, hiring and training 
labor, etc.," Kripke urged, "The public is certainly not as able as the 
management of a corporation to understand the meaning, results 
and implications of the complex accounting events which have oc-
curred in any dynamic company or of differential rates of improve-
ment or decline in the sales volume and profitability of different 
product lines. "187 
Thus, a more realistic fear, argued Kripke, was that by prohibit-
ing disclosure of earnings projections, the SEC had perpetuated a 
form of differential disclosure: "The professionals get management 
projections informally through press conferences, speeches to ana-
lysts' societies or press releases, and these projections form the ba-
sis for professional judgments. Under its present system the SEC 
precludes the giving of this information equally to all investors 
through the documents filed with it .... "188 
By the late 1970s, the SEC reversed its position and adopted 
safe harbor rules to encourage disclosure of soft information.189 
More significantly, as· part of its 1982 integrated disclosure system, 
the SEC adopted Item 303, which mandates management discussion 
and analysis of known trends or uncertainties concerning a regis-
trant's liquidity, capital resources, and income.190 Item 303 is the 
key part of the evolution of the SEC's approach to accounting from 
an emphasis on "hard fact" to its present emphasis on "soft" or 
predictive information. It is a comprehensive disclosure item. In 
effect, the SEC staff has employed the concepts of liquidity and 
capital resources to require managers to comment on material 
changes that may occur in a registrant's balance sheet and the con-
cept of results of operations to inspire similar disclosures concern-
ing a registrant's income statement. 
186. See Homer Kripke, The SEC, the Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities, 45 
N.Y.U. L. REv.1151, 1198 (1970). 
187. Id. at 1197-98. 
188. Id. at 1199. 
189. Rule 175, 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1994) (under the 1933 Act); Rule 3b-6, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.3b-6 (1994) (under the 1934 Act). See discussion and analysis in 2 Loss & SEUOMAN, 
supra note 1, at 622-36. 
190. Regulation S-K Item 303, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (1994); see 2 Loss & SEUOMAN, supra 
note 1, at 668-72. 
February 1995] The Obsolescence of Wall Street 695 
In 1989, the SEC published an interpretation release concerning 
Item 303.191 The release highlighted, among other topics, that the 
SEC now regarded disclosure of predictive or soft information as 
mandatory in a wide variety of circumstances.192 This mandate was 
still more recently given "teeth" by $EC enforcement actions spe-
cifically based on Item 303.193 
When the changes in the scope of the 1933 Act registration 
statement requirements and the "soft information" expansion of 
the disclosure requirements are considered simultaneously, predic-
tions that the SEC's mandatory disclosure system will soon wither 
or die194 appear to be premature. To be sure, foreign issuers have 
declined to be listed on U.S. securities markets because of our more 
191. Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Oper-
ations; Certain Investment Company Disclosures, Securities Act Release No. 33-6835, 43 
SEC Docket (CCH) 1330 (May 18, 1989). 
192. The SEC explained the "critical distinction" between mandatory and voluntary dis-
closure of soft information as follows: 
The Project results confirm that the distinction between prospective information that 
is required to be discussed and voluntary forward-looking disclosure is an area requiring 
additional attention. This critical distinction is explained in the Concept Release: 
Both required disclosure regarding the future impact of presently known trends, 
events or uncertainties and optional forward-looking information may involve some pre-
diction or projection. The distinction between the two rests with the nature of the pre-
diction required. Required disclosure is based on currently known trends, events, and 
uncertainties that are reasonably expected to have material effects, such as: A reduction in 
the registrant's product prices; erosion in the registrant's market share; changes in insur-
ance coverage; or the likely non-renewal of a material contract. In contrast, optional 
forward-looking disclosure involves anticipating a futu.re trend or event or anticipating a 
less predictable impact of a known event, trend or uncertainty. 
43 SEC Docket (CCH) at 1333 (relying heavily on Concept Release on Management's Dis-
cussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Operations, Securities Act Release 33-6711, 
38 SEC Docket (CCH) 138, 140-41 (Apr. 17, 1987)). 
193. In In re Caterpillar, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 34-30,532, 51 SEC Docket 
(CCH) 147 (Mar. 31, 1992), the SEC issued a cease-and-desist order for Caterpillar's failure 
to disclose information about its Brazilian subsidiary, CBSA, which was responsible in 1989 
for 23% of Caterpillar's net profits although its revenues represented only 5% of the parent 
company's revenues. The SEC, after explaining that Caterpillar was not required to prepare 
its consolidated financial statements showing CBSA as either an industry segment or a for-
eign operation, emphasized: "Since separate information about CBSA was neither required 
nor provided in Caterpillar's financial statements or the notes thereto, there was little, if any, 
information in the financial statements or accompanying notes that would inform a reader as 
to the importance of CBSA's earnings to Caterpillar's overall results of operations." 51 SEC 
Docket (CCH) at 152. This was required both because the CBSA earnings materially af-
fected Caterpillar's reported income from continuing operations, and because there was a 
future uncertainty regarding CBSA's operations, as well as a concomitant possible risk of 
Caterpillar having materially lower earnings as a result of that risk. 51 SEC Docket (CCH) 
at 152-53. 
In In re Shared Med. Sys. Corp., Securities Act Release No. 33-33,632, 56 SEC Docket 
(CCH) 199 (Feb. 17, 1994), the Commission settled a cease-and-desist proceeding with an 
issuer that disclosed a known unfavorable trend in sales activity in a February 17, 1987 press 
release but failed to make the same disclosure in the Management Discussion and Analysis 
(MD&A) portion of its 1986 Form 10-K annual report or in its first quarter 1987 Form 10-Q. 
194. Cf. Winter, supra note 19. 
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demanding disclosure requirements.195 But the pressure to reduce 
U.S. disclosure requirements to secure foreign "listings" appears, at 
least momentarily, to have dissipated in 1993 when Daimler-Benz 
AG became the first German firm to register in the U.S. securities 
markets in recent years.196 
Over time, competitive pressure from foreign securities markets 
will ultimately lead to further changes in the mandatory disclosure 
system. But, it is as yet uncertain whether future changes will be of 
a fundamental nature, like the scope reductions represented by 
Form S-3 and Rule 415, or of a more tinkering nature, such as im-
material changes in U.S. generally accepted accounting principles 
applicable to foreign registrants.197 To put this another way, it is no 
more certain for the foreseeable future that the United States will 
have to make further fundamental changes in its mandatory disclo-
sure system to retain domestic or foreign securities sales than it is 
that foreign issuers will have to comply with U.S. standards in order 
to have access to the U.S. securities markets, currently the world's 
largest. What the experience with Form S-3 and Rule 415 has 
taught, however, is that concern that securities sales will be ex-
ported remains the most erosive potential element in federal securi-
ties regulation. 
C. Municipal Securities Regulation 
It also seems clear that in the foreseeable future there may well 
be further significant expansion of the SEC's role in one of its larg-
est areas of exemption, municipal securities regulation.198 
195. See Joseph McLaughlin, Listing Foreign Stocks on U.S. Exchanges: Time to Confront 
Reconciliation?, 24 REv. SEc. & COMMODITIES REo. 91 (1991). 
196. See Breeden Announces Daimler-Benz Will File to Trade Stock in U.S. Markets, 25 
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 477 (Apr. 2, 1993). Notably, Daimler-Benz agreed to provide 
financial infonnation prepared in accordance with the United States' generally accepted ac-
counting principles. Id. at 478. 
In late 1991, the NYSE let it be known that it was drafting a proposal to relax foreign 
listing standards. Under this proposal, foreign issuers would not have to file financial state-
ments prepared on the basis of accounting principles generally accepted in the United States. 
Chainnan Breeden testified on July 25, 1991, that he opposed this type of "retreat" from U.S. 
accounting standards. NYSE Drafting Plan to Boost Listings by Foreign Firms, Despite SEC 
Opposition, 23 Sec. Reg. & L Rep. (BNA) 1754 (Dec. 20, 1991). 
197. Ct Edward F. Greene et al., Hegemony or Deference: U.S. Disclosure Requirements 
in the International Capital Markets, 50 Bus. LAw. (forthcoming Feb.1995) (discussing possi-
ble changes in the mandatory disclosure system and advocating an approach giving greater 
deference to the disclosure systems of foreign countries). 
198. See 3 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 1159 ("In contemporary finance, the term 
municipal securities broadly refers to securities issued by states, their political subdivisions 
such as cities, towns, or counties, or their instrumentalities such as school districts or port 
authorities."); 3 id. at 1159-73; 1 id. at 285-307. 
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Municipal securities are usually categorized into two general 
types. First, there are general obligation securities that are backed 
by the taxing power or "full faith and credit" of the issuing govern-
mental unit. Second, there are revenue securities backed solely by 
the revenues from a specific project such as a port, airport, bridge, 
or tunnel authority. In recent years, only twenty-five to thirty per-
cent of all municipal securities have been "general obligations"; ap-
proximately seventy to seventy-five percent have been revenue 
bonds.199 One form of revenue bond, the industrial development or 
conduit bond, has proved particularly controversial. Industrial de-
velopment bonds are issued by a local government agency to buy or 
build a facility or to purchase equipment that a private business 
firm will then buy on installment or lease over periods that typically 
run from five to thirty years. The business firm will pay a rent that 
usually is equal to the amount necessary to pay principal and inter-
est on the bonds. Because the only security for the bonds is the 
revenue from the lease payments paid by the business firm - or 
the facility leased by the firm - the SEC in 1978 took the position 
"that industrial development bonds ... in substance are obligations 
of a business enterprise" and therefore "are sufficiently distinct 
from other municipal securities to warrant treatment under a sepa-
rate regulatory framework."200 
In 1993, the SEC Staff Report on the Municipal Securities Market, [1993 Transfer Binder] 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) <J: 85,217 (Sept. 3, 1993) [hereinafter SEC Staff Report], stated: 
"The municipal securities market comprises approximately 50,000 state and local issuers with 
an outstanding principal amount of securities in excess of $1.2 trillion .... Approximately 
2,600 municipal securities dealers, banks, and brokers actively trade in municipal securities." 
Id. 'I 84,334. 
Later, the Commission added: 
In 1993, a record level of over $335 billion in municipal securities was sold, represent-
ing over 17,000 issues. This record financing was heavily influenced by refundings. Nev-
ertheless, the level of long term new money financings, representing 49% of financings 
for the year, reflected continued growth. In 1993, there were $142 billion of new money 
long term financings, compared to $81 billion in 1988, a 75% increase. 
Statement of the Commission Regarding Disclosure Obligations of Municipal Securities Issu-
ers and Others, Securities Act Release No. 33-7049, 56 SEC Docket (CCH) 479, 480-81 
(Mar. 9, 1994). 
199. GENERAL AccoUNTING OrnCE, TRENDS AND CHANGES IN nm MUNICIPAL BoND 
MARKET AS THEY RELATE TO FINANCING STATE AND LoCAL Ptrauc INFRASTRUCIURE 50 
(1983). 
200. Letter to Senator Harrison Williams from SEC Chairman Harold Williams, May 1, 
1978, reprinted in 124 CoNG. REc. 21,639 (July 19, 1978); see also Robert A. Fippinger, Secur-
ities Law Disclosure Requirements for the Political Subdivision Threatened with Bankruptcy, 
10 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 541, 546-47 (1982); Eric M. Hellige, Industrial Development Bonds: 
The Disclosure Dilemma, 6 J. CoRP. L. 291 (1981). 
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Nonetheless, section 3(a)(2) of the 1933 Act exempts virtually 
all municipal securities.201 The near default of New York City se-
curities between 1974 and 1975 and the subsequent default by the 
Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS) after expending 
$2.25 billion to construct two nuclear power plants revived the de-
bate as to whether issuers, particularly of industrial revenue 1,)onds, 
should be subject to a mandatory disclosure system comparable to 
that for corporate issuers.202 
As the full Commission explained after the 1988 staff report on 
WPP SS: 
[T]he most disturbing aspect of the Supply System problems is that 
they arose after the New York City Report, after the subsequent vol-
untary improvements in municipal disclosure, and after most of the 
additional regulatory actions discussed [elsewhere]. Events such as 
the Supply System default inevitably focus attention on the adequacy 
of the current regulation of the municipal securities markets.203 
Moreover, the SEC found that the New York City and WPPSS 
instances were not isolated: 
In the period from 1972 to 1983, there were eleven defaults involving 
general obligation instruments, 25 defaults involving non-conduit rev-
201. Securities Act§ 3(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(z) (1988). Industrial development bonds 
are only exempt if they are tax exempt under § 103 of the Internal Revenue Code. 
Over time, the SEC has used its rulemaking authority to tighten its regulation of indus-
trial revenue bonds. Until January 1, 1969, it was the SEC's policy not to object if the issuer 
obtained an opinion of its own counsel to the effect that these bonds fell within the language 
of § 3(a)(2). Cf. Missouri Atty. Gen. Op., 1954-1971 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) If 70,322 
(1956). But the Commission adopted a pair of definitional rules for bonds sold after that 
date - Rule 131 under the 1933 Act and Rule 3b-5 under the 1934 Act - in order to 
identify the interest in the obligation of the private company as a separate "security" issued 
by the company. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.131, 240.3b-5 (1994). Any part of an obligation evi-
denced by any bond, note, debenture, or other evidence of indebtedness issued by any gov-
ernmental unit specified in § 3(a)(2) of the 1933 Act or § 3(a)(12) of the 1934 Act and 
"payable from payments to be made in respect of property or money which is or will be used, 
under a lease, sale, or loan arrangement, by or for industrial or commercial enterprise" is 
considered a separate "security" issued by the lessee or obligor. 17 C.F.R. § 230.131 (1994). 
Loan and sale as well as lease arrangements are covered in recognition of the fact that essen-
tially the same kind of financing plan could be carried out by a governmental body's lending 
the proceeds of the bonds to private enterprise on a deferred payment basis. 
202. 3 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note l, at 1162-63. For a discussion of this debate in the 
period preceding the WPPSS debacle, see 3 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 1, at 1163-70. 
Regarding the near default in New York City, see SEC, SUBcoMM. ON EcoN. STABIUZA· 
TION OF nm HOUSE CoMM. ON BANKING, FIN. AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 95m CoNo., lST SESS., 
STAFF REPORT ON TRANSAcnONS IN SECURITIES OF nm CrrY OF NEW YORK (Comm. Print 
1977), summarized in 3 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 1, at 1162-63 n.56. Regarding the 
WPPSS, see Staff Report on the Investigation in the Matter of 'Ii'ansactions in Washington 
Public Power Supply System Securities, reprinted in part in 1988-1989 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) If 84,327 (1988); Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 1, at 289-95 (Supp. 1994) (summariz-
ing the staff report). 
203. Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission on the Regulation of Municipal 
Securities, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) lflf 84,325, 89,436 (Sept. 22, 
1988) [hereinafter Report on Regulation of Municipal Securities]. 
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enue bonds, and at least 82 private purpose (conduit) bond de-
faults .... Moreover, the Bond Investors Association indicates that, 
from 1983 to the first quarter of 1988, over 300 municipal issuers de-
faulted on their obligations.204 
In all, the municipal debt default rate of approximately 0.7% was 
nearly equal to the corporate debt default rate of 1.1 %.20s 
The SEC and Congress have moved incrementally, but steadily, 
in the period after the New York City bond crisis and WPPSS de-
fault to expand federal securities regulation. First, in 1975 Congress 
enacted section 15B of the Securities Exchange Act to establish ju-
risdiction over municipal securities dealers, subject to a self-
regulatory organization called the Municipal Securities Rulemaking 
Board (MSRB).206 Second, in 1990 the SEC approved a rule pro-
posal made by the MSRB to require the mandatory :filing of offer-
ing statements by municipal issuers.201 Third, the SEC adopted 
Rule 15c2-12, which makes it unlawful for any broker, dealer, or 
municipal securities dealer to ac~ as underwriter in a primary mu-
nicipal securities offering with an aggregate offering price of $1 mil-
lion or more unless (i) before bidding for or buying the securities it 
obtained and reviewed an officiai statement that was complete ex-
cept for certain transaction-related data; (ii) it forwarded copies of 
the official statement to any potential customer· on request; (iii) it 
obtained final copies of the official statement within seven business 
204. Id. 'I 89,436 n.57 (citation omitted). 
205. PUBLIC SEC. AssN., MUNICIPAL SECURII1ES DISCLOSURE TASK FORCE REPORT: INI-
TIAL ANALYSIS OF CuRRENr DISCLOSURE PRAcnCES IN nm MUNICIPAL SECURITIES MAR-
KET (1988), cited in Report on Regulation of Municipal Securities, supra note 203, 'I 89,437 
n.58. 
206. Securities Act Amendments of1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 15B(b)(l), 89 Stat. 97, 132. 
See generally 6 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 3086-9:S. 
207. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Delivery of Official State-
ments and Recordkeeping, Exchange Act Release No. 34-28081, 46 SEC Docket (CCH) 563 
(June 1, 1990). Tue following year, the SEC approved a further rule change to permit the 
MSRB to establish and operate a central electronic facility, the Municipal Securities Informa-
tion Library, through which information collected pursuant to MSRB Rule G-36 would be 
made available electronically to market participants and information vendors. Order Ap-
proving Proposed Rule Change of the MSRB Relating to the Proposed Operation of the 
Official Statement and Advance Refunding Document, Exchange Act Release No. 34-29298, 
49 SEC Docket (CCH) 34, 34 (June 13, 1991). In 1991, Rule G-36 was amended also to 
require underwriters to deliver advance refunding documents to the MSRB. Order Approv-
ing Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Delivery of Advance Refunding Documents, Ex-
change Act Release No. 34-29299, 49 SEC Docket (CCH) 50 (June 13, 1991). 
In April of 1992, the SEC approved a MSRB proposal to establish and operate the Con-
tinuing Disclosure Information Pilot System, which - functioning as part of the Library -
will "accept and disseminate voluntary submissions of official continuing disclosure docu-
ments relating to outstanding issues of municipal securities." Order Approving Proposed 
Rule Change of the MSRB Relating to the Proposed Operation of the Continuing Disclosure 
Information Pilot System, Exchange Act Release No. 34-30556, 51 SEC Docket (CCH) 231, 
232 (Apr. 6, 1992) (emphasis added). 
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days after any final agreement to buy or sell the municipal securi-
ties; and (iv) it forwarded copies of the final official statement to 
any potential customer from the time the final official statement 
became available until the earlier of ninety days from the end of the 
underwriting period or the time when the official statement was 
available to any person from a nationally recognized municipal se-
curities information repository, but in no case less than twenty-five 
days after the end of the underwriting period.2os Along with this 
rule, the SEC published interpretative commentary emphasizing 
the obligation of a municipal underwriter to have a reasonable basis 
for recommending any municipal securities and its responsibility in 
fulfilling that obligation to review in a professional manner the ac-
curacy of offering statements with which it is associated.209 These 
are roughly the same due diligence requirements applicable to cor-
porate issuers under section 11 of the 1933 Securities Act,210 
Fourth, in 1993, after a spate of allegations of illegal payoffs and 
influence peddling, Congressmen Dingell and Markey requested an 
SEC Statement regarding whether the "Tower Amendment" in sec-
tions 15Bd(l)-(2) of the 1934 Act211 - prohibiting 1933-Act type 
disclosure documents from being filed before a municipal issuance 
- should be repealeq in whole or in part.212 An earlier SEC staff 
report appeared to sympathize with this proposal.213 Subsequently, 
in 1994, the SEC published statements indicating an intent to 
208. Municipal Securities Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 34-34961, 57 SEC 
Docket (CCH) 2994 (Nov. 17, 1994) (amendments to Rule 15c2-12); Municipal Securities 
Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 34-26985, 43 SEC Docket (CCH) 1880 (June 28, 1989) 
(adopted rule); Municipal Securities Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 34-26100, 41 
SEC Docket (CCH) 1131 (Sept. 22, 1988) (proposed rule). 
209. 43 SEC Docket (CCH) at 1898-900; see also 41 SEC Docket (CCH) at 1148-49. 
210. Securities Act § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1988); see supra note 181 and accompanying 
text. 
211. Securities Act Amendments of 1975, sec. 13, § 15B(d), 89 Stat. 97, 137 (codified at 
15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(d) (1988)) (amending § 15 of the Exchange Act). 
212. Congressmen Ask SEC to Review Municipal Securities Regulation, 25 Sec. Reg. & L. 
Rep. (BNA) 787 (June 4, 1993). 
213. The SEC Staff Report on the Municipal Securities Market, [1993 Transfer Binder] 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'I 85,217 (Sept. 15, 1993), while finding that "the municipal market 
generally functions in an effective manner," id. 'I 84,333, nonetheless identified "significant 
areas where improvements can be made," id. With respect to municipal issuer disclosure, the 
report stated: 
-Because of the voluntary nature of municipal issuer disclosure, there is a marked 
variance in the quality of disclosure, during both the primary offering stage and in the 
secondary market. The Staff believes that voluntary efforts to increase disclosure in the 
municipal securities market, while constructive, have not resulted in complete and com-
prehensive disclosure of the financial condition of issuers of municipal securities. 
-In the Staff's view, comprehensive improvement of the existing system would re-
quire Congressional action. Congress could provide the Commission with specific statu-
tory authority to set disclosure standards for municipal issuers, or even rescind the 
exempt status of municipal bonds under the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, 
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tighten municipal disclosure requirements further, either through 
legislation or through rulemaking.214 
Proposals of this type, if adopted, would go far toward applying 
a mandatory disclosure system to the municipal securities market. 
Underlying this evolution toward greater federal securities regula-
tion has been a notable change in investors of municipal securities. 
As a 1993 SEC staff report explained: 
The profile of the typical investor in municipal securities also has 
changed dramatically over this century. Historically, investors in mu-
nicipal bonds were institutions and wealthy individuals wishing to 
take advantage of the tax-exempt status of fairly low-risk municipal 
securities. The interest received by holders of most municipal securi-
ties was exempt from federal income taxation, and in some cases, 
from state and local income taxation, and thus was very attractive to 
taxpayers in higher tax brackets. With the changing income tax rates, 
persons of more moderate means increasingly have invested in munic-
ipal securities. Today, households are the largest holders of municipal 
debt, followed by municipal bond mutual funds, property and casualty 
insurers, commercial banks, and money market funds.21s 
thereby subjecting them to the registration and continuous reporting obligations applica-
ble to corporate and foreign government bond issuers. 
-If Congress chooses not to provide the Commission with full authority to create 
comprehensive and complete disclosure in this area, the Commission could explore ways 
to improve initial and secondary market disclosure, to the extent possible, under its ex-
isting authority. 
-The Staff strongly believes, however, that any Commission action in this area 
could not fully address existing disclosure problems. Comprehensive improvements to 
the existing system would require legislation. At a minimum, the Staff supports across-
the-board registration of corporate obligations underlying conduit bonds so as to assure 
equal regulatory treatment of corporate obligations whether or not such obligations 
nominally are issued through a municipal entity. 
Id. 'H 84,333-34. 
214. In 1994, the SEC published a detailed Statement of the Commission Regarding Dis-
closure Obligations of Municipal Securities Issuers and Others, Securities Act Release No. 
33-7049, 56 SEC Docket (CCH) 479 (Mar. 9, 1994). While praising voluntary disclosure 
guidelines issued by the Government Fmance Officers Association and the National Federa-
tion of Municipal Analysts, see id. at 484, 491, 493-94, and noting that 46 states currently 
require, or are in the process of establishing a requirement, that state government financial 
statements be prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles 
(GAAP), as determined by the Government Accounting Standards Board (GASB), id. at 
486-87, the SEC found that "there continue to be concerns with the adequacy of municipal 
offering disclosure, particularly with respect to offerings of non-general obligation bonds and 
smaller issues," id. at 482. See generally id. at 482-83. 
Accordingly, this interpretative release addressed four topics, including the following: 
(2) The Commission is renewing its recommendation for legislation to repeal the 
exemption for corporate obligations underlying certain conduit securities from the regis-
tration and reporting requirements of the federal securities laws. 
(3) Particularly because of their public nature, issuers in the municipal market rou-
tinely make public statements and issue reports that can affect the market for their se-
curities; without a mechanism for providing ongoing disclosures to investors, these 
disclosures may cause the issuer to violate the antifraud provisions ..•. 
Id. at 480. 
215. SEC Staff Report, supra note 198, 'i 84,335 (footnotes omitted). 
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In essence, just as a growth in individual investor interest in cor-
porate securities may have been the key dynamic in prompting and 
sustaining interest in a mandatory disclosure system, similar interest 
in tax-exempt municipal securities appears to have fueled a more 
recent enthusiasm for greater federal mandatory municipal securi-
ties regulation disclosure. 
ill. ~,Of'l'CLUSION 
Ultimately, the resolution of the boundaries of federal securities 
regulation will involve a complex interplay of contextual and polit-
ical factors. What is clear is that no single dynamic will be decisive 
in all applications. The enormous expansion of individual investor 
interest in corporate and, more recently, municipal securities may 
long check t4e countervailing preserves for erosion of mandatory 
standards associated with institutional investor interest and compet-
itive foreign securities markets. Erosion of standards in one area -
such as the 1933 Act - may well be concomitant with expansion or 
cognate standards - such as the periodic mandatory disclosure re-
quirements under the 1934 Act. What does seem probable is that 
for the foreseeable future, while change may occur at the margins 
of federal securities regulation, the enduring need to remediate in-
formation asymmetries will keep core areas of this regulation intact. 
